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"Do not go gentle into that good night, old age should bum and
rave at close of day ..
-Dylan Thomas'
I. INTRODUCTION
GROWING OLDER. While it can bring wisdom and experi-
ence, in many American workplaces, it can also bring pain-
I Dylan Thomas, Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night, in THE OXFORD BOOK OF
TWENTIETH-CENTURY ENGLISH VERSE 474 (Philip Larkin ed., 1973).
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ful consequences. An employer seeking youthful enthusiasm in
his work force might make an older worker's job unbearable in
the hope that the employee will become frustrated and quit. Al-
ternatively, that employer might decide to take matters into his
own hands and unfairly fire the aging worker.
Since 1967, age discrimination in the workplace has been un-
lawful in the United States. The ADEA, or Age Discrimination
in Employment Act,2 has given older workers the statutory
means to "burn and rave"3 at unfair treatment in their profes-
sional lives as a result of their age. It was enacted by Congress
"to promote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in em-
ployment; [and] to help employers, and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employ-
ment."4 The ADEA has served as a significant protection against
age-related bias for employees nationwide since its passage by
Congress.
However, under section 104 of the Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.),' the tax treatment of damages received in age-related
ADEA claims has been unclear. Section 104(a) (2) allows tax-
payers to exclude from gross income the amount of any dam-
ages received "on account of personal injuries or sickness."6
The broad wording of this section has resulted in many interpre-
tations; its application in various contexts, including the taxabil-
ity of age-related damages, has been inconsistent.
On August 30, 1994, uncertainty as to the meaning of section
104(a) (2) with respect to such age-related damages became
even more pronounced when the Seventh and the Ninth Cir-
cuits split, rendering opposite Opinions on the same day as to
taxability of ADEA damages under I.R.C. section 104(a) (2).
2 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994)
[hereinafter ADEA].
3 Thomas, supra note 1. Though the "good night" to which Thomas refers in
the poem is death, age-based loss of work can result in feelings of loss, pain, and
darkness for the affected employee-effectively, a "dark night."
4 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
5 I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (West 1994). The term "damages" is used in this com-
ment to refer to damages received both through judgments and settlements,
since § 104(a) (2) specifically includes both in the exception. Id. Section
104(a)(2) provides, in part, "[G]ross income does not include . . . (2) the
amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as
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The circuit courts' rulings came in two factually similar cases,
Downey v. Commissioner and Schmitz v. Commissioner.' Though
the Downey and Schmitz courts reached opposite conclusions on
the taxability of the ADEA damages, both circuits relied on the
Supreme Court decision United States v. Burke9 to reach these dif-
fering conclusions.
The same-day holdings of the two circuit courts in Downey and
Schmitzjoined an already varied range of interpretations among
circuits of the meaning of section 104(a) (2) as applied to age-
related ADEA damages.10 The Fifth Circuit had joined the de-
bate just before Downey and Schmitz came down in the form of a
very brief per curiam opinion, Schleier v. Commissioner,11 enunci-
ated on June 21, 1994. The analysis and results in Downey,
,Schmitz, and Schleier, the three cases on which this comment fo-
cuses, reflect the underlying analytical confusion that existed
concerning both the purpose and scope of section 104(a) (2)
and the means of applying the test for exclusion of non-physical
damages established by the Supreme Court in Burke, for each of
the three circuits applied what it perceived to be the law pertain-
ing to that section differently. 12
Recognizing this deepening confusion, the Supreme Court in
November of 1994 responded to an appeal of the Fifth Circuit
decision by the Solicitor General of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice by granting certiorari.1 3 After hearing oral arguments the
following March, the Court handed down its decision in June of
1995.14 The holding surprised many who had followed the issue
through the deepening split among circuits.
The split in circuits leading to the grant of certiorari and the
Supreme Court's decision in Schleier are important for a number
of reasons. First, the issue of the taxability of age-related dam-
ages under the ADEA has been the subject of intense specula-
tion, as this comment notes, in the years since Burke was handed
7 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
8 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994).
504 U.S. 229 (1992).
10 See Rickel v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 1990); Pistillo v. Com-
missioner, 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1990); Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d
211, 216 (3d Cir. 1989). All held that ADEA awards were excludable from
income.
11 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
12 See infra parts IV and V for a discussion of each circuit's approach.
13 Schleier v. Commissioner, 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994).
14 Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2159 (holding that amounts received in settlement of
ADEA claims were not excludable from gross income).
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down. The Schleier court technically addressed that issue, but at
the same time, the decision highlighted the many unanswered
questions that exist about the scope of section 104(a) (2).
Schleier is an important decision in that respect as well. Thirdly,
the split and the subsequent Supreme Court decision may lead
to much-needed steps for further clarification of what the poli-
cies and goals of the exclusion are.
And finally, Schleier's resolution of the taxability issue concern-
ing ADEA damages is significant in that it will affect the airline
industry, its management, and its employees. Schleier and the
two cases that comprised the Seventh and Ninth Circuit split all
involved airline employees who were part of age discrimination
suits against their airlines. In Downey and Schmitz, the taxpayers
were former United Airlines pilots, each of whom had received
settlement awards based on claims of ADEA violations. 15  The
plaintiff in Schleier was also a United pilot who had been forced
to retire at age 60.16 These three pilots are not unique; the
ADEA has been the basis of claims against airlines for many
years.1 7 The taxability issues confronting the three pilots in-
volved in the cases examined herein, therefore, are representa-
tive of the positions of many pilots and other airline employees
who have received ADEA-based awards from their employers,
some as part of significant class action suits. This comment ex-
amines the historical and present-day interpretations of section
104(a) (2) and the Burke decision as backdrops to the August 30
split between the two circuits. It then sets forth the three posi-
tions18 taken in the Seventh and Ninth Circuit opinions and the
Fifth Circuit's position in Schleier. After describing the Supreme
Court's decision to grant certiorari, it lays out the high court's
analysis and holding in Schleier and describes the reaction of
commentators to the decision. Finally, this comment discusses
additional considerations for the future, as well as some of the
possible implications to airlines and their employees of the
Supreme Court's holding in Schleier.
15 Downey v. Commissioner, 33. F.3d 836, 837 (1994); Schmitz v. Commis-
sioner, 34 F.3d 790, 791 (1994).
16 Lyle Denniston, High Court to Rule on Taxation of Damage Awards, THE BALTI-
MORE SUN, Nov. 14, 1994, at 9C.
17 Downey, Schmitz, and Schleier are only three among many age-related discrimi-
nation cases brought against the airlines.
18 This comment describes the majority opinions in Schmitz and Downey as well
as Judge Trott's concurrence in Schmitz.
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II. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF
I.R.C. SECTION 104(a) (2): WHAT DOES "ON
ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL INJURIES OR
SICKNESS" MEAN?
A. BACKGROUNP
Section. 61 (a) of the I.R.C. defines "gross income" as "all in-
come from whatever source derived." 19 The Supreme Court has
long interpreted that language as a reflection of Congressional
intent to exert "the full measure of its taxing power,"20 and ac-
cordingly, has given the concept of gross income a liberal
construction.2 1
In the landmark case of Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 22
the Supreme Court set forth a definition for gross income that
has become a standard. The Court stated that "undeniable ac-
cessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion" constitute gross income.2 3 The Glen-
shaw Court stated that it would afford a liberal interpretation of
gross income based on the Court's "recognition of the intention
of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically
exempted."2 4
B. SECTION 104(a) (2)'s EXCLUSION FOR DAMAGES RESULTING
FROM PERSONAL INJURY OR SICKNESS
Section 104(a) (2) is one such specific exception. Its prede-
cessor, section 213(b) (6), was adopted by Congress in the Reve-
nue Act of 1918 to provide for exclusion of damages resulting
19 I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 1994).
20 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940) (quoted in Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955)). The Glenshaw Court points to
three cases consistent with this interpretation: Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 (1937); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935); and
Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 166 (1925) (reflecting the Supreme Court's view that
Congress used the language of I.R.C. § 61 (a) to establish a broad-sweeping power
to tax).
21 Paul C. Feinberg, Federal Income Taxation of Punitive Damages Awarded in Per-
sonalInjuy Actions, 42 CAsE W. REs. L. Rv. 339, 342 (1992). Feinberg's thorough
article contains information on the creation of the "personal injury or sickness"
exception and its subsequent interpretations.
22 348 U.S. at 426.
23 Id. at 431.
24 Id. at 430. The Court noted two other cases in support of its proposition:
Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949); and Helvering v. Stockholms
Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87-91 (1934). Id.
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from personal injury or sickness.2 5 Boris Bittker and Martin Mc-
Mahon give one explanation for inclusion in the Code of this
exception to taxation: "The rationale for this exclusion, which is
interpreted by the regulations to embrace claims based on 'tort
or tort type rights,' is presumably that the recovery does not gen-
erate a gain or profit but only makes the taxpayer whole by com-
pensating for a loss."26 The current version of I.R.C. section
213(b)(6) is I.R.C. section 104(a)(2), -which was enacted in
1990. Like section 213, section 104(a) (2) allows taxpayers to ex-
clude from taxable gross income damages received "on account
of personal injuries or sickness. "27
C. Tim SCOPE OF THE SECTION 104(A) (2) EXCLUSION,
INCLUDING THE EFFECT OF THE 1989 AMENDMENT
The term "personal injuries" is not, however, defined in
either the statute or the legislative history of section 104(a) (2).28
Given the absence of a congressional definition of scope, inter-
pretation has evolved over time. Initially, the phrase "personal
injuries" was interpreted to pertain to physical injuries only.2 9
Courts then began to expand the exemption to nonphysical per-
sonal injury awards.3 After this gradual expansion, "the phrase
'personal injuries or sickness' as used in Section 104(a) (2) now
embraces emotional distress, libel, slander, and other nonphysi-
cal wrongs. " "
25 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b) (6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065-66
(1919).
26 Bomas I. BrIrTKR & MARTIN J. McMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDrIVUALs § 7.5 (1988 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter BrrrKER & MCMAHON].
27 I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (1994).
28 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1954). See also Sex Case Cited to Include/Exclude
Age Discrimination Award 79J. TAx'N 158 (1993).
2 Arthur W. Andrews, The Taxation of Title VII Victims After the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 46 TAx LAW. 755, 757 (1993); see also Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach
to the Taxation of Employment Discrimination Recoveries Under Federal Civil Rights Stat-
utes: Income from Human Capital, Realization, and Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. REv.
549 (1994) (discussing the progression toward a broadening of the exclusion).
30 Andrews, supra note 29, at 757 n.19; see also Burke, 504 U.S. at 237 n.6 (dis-
cussing the broadening of the section 104(a) (2) exclusion to include damages
resulting from nonphysical personal injuries); Robert Nath, Damage Awards: In-
cluded or Excluded?, 94 TAx NoTEs TODAY 202-08 (Oct. 14, 1994) (briefly tracing
the movement from a requirement of physical injury to inclusion of other torts
beginning with Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1285, 1294 (1986), aff'd, 848
F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988)).
31 BirrKr & MCMAHON, supra note 26, § 7-6.
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Given the movement to exclude more than strictly physical in-
juries, excludability under section 104(a) (2) of certain types of
damages received has become the source of considerable con-
troversy.3 2 In 1989, Congress responded by attempting to clarify
section 104(a) (2) through an amendment included in the Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.33 At the time, there
was some movement to modify the section to severely restrict
exclusions.3 4 As the legislative history reflects, however, there
was ambivalence in both houses about any such severe restric-
tion, 3 and ultimately, the change was limited to amending the
statute to prevent the use of the section 104(a) (2) exclusion for
punitive damages in nonphysical injury and sickness cases.3 6
The inclusion of punitive damages was expressly limited to puni-
tive damages received afierJune 10, 1989. a However, even the
amendment to section 104(a) (2) has been .inconsistently ap-
plied and has generated considerable controversy; some courts
have held that post-1989 punitive damages may still be excluded
if a connection exists between the punitive damages and a physi-
cal condition developed by the taxpayer as a result of his or her
personal injury. 8
Despite this movement to reform section 104(a) (2) in 1989,
the exclusion of awards for physical and non-physical injuries
was left intact-and ambiguous.3 9 Apart from the Congres-
sional attempt to remove nonphysical personal injury punitives
from the section's exception, the cornerstone of analysis of sec-
tion 104(a) (2) has remained fairly consistent: for over twenty-
five years, courts have analyzed whether something fell within
the section 104(a) (2) exception by looking to "traditional tort
principles."40 Relying on language found in Treasury Regula-
32 Andrews, supra note 29, at 757.
33 Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641 (a), 103 Stat. 2106 (1989) [hereinafter OBRA of
1989].
34 Andrews, supra note 29, at 757-58.
35 Id. at 758.
36 Id.
7 OBRA of 1989; Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792 n.1.
38 John Gardner & Susan L. Willey, Taxation of Back Pay Awards Is Still Uncertain,
21 TAX'N FOR LAW. 224, 230 (1993). For a complete discussion of the implica-
tions of the 1989 amendment (a detailed treatment of which is beyond the scope
of this comment), see Feinberg, supra note 21, who provides a comprehensive
analysis of the amendment and its inception. See also Craig Day, Comment, Taxa-
tion of Punitive Damages: Interpreting § 104(a)(2) After the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1989, 66 WASH. L. REv. 1019 (1991).
3 Andrews, supra note 29, at 758.
40 Id. at 758 n.24.
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tion 1.104-1(c), the Internal Revenue Service and courts have
said that if the injury is found to be "tort or tort-type," the result-
ing damages are excludable.41
To determine whether an injury is "tort or tort-type," courts
judge the nature of the injury not by its effects, but by looking to
the nature of the underlying claim.41 If the nature of the under-
lying claim is such that an award or settlement adds to the plain-
tiff's wealth, it falls within the Glenshaw Glass concept of
"undeniable accession to wealth"43 and is deemed taxable. In
contrast, if the underlying claim in'volves a loss of some type, the
award or settlement merely compensates the plaintiff for his loss
by restoring him to his status prior to the injury. In that case,
the plaintiff realizes no new wealth, and such amounts are not
taxable.44
Even with that level of definition, exclusions under the sec-
tion 104(a) (2) exceptions continued to be granted inconsis-
tently by courts. Determination of what was "tort or tort-type"
using the "nature of the underlying claim" test was elusive, and
courts were mired in confusion over how that test should be ap-
plied.45 In 1992, the Supreme Court attempted to clear up the
confusion by validating the "nature of the underlying claim" test
being used in some circuits and explaining how it was to be ap-
plied in a decision of major importance, United States v. Burke.46
Until Schleier, it was the single most significant statement on the
41 See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1993) (stating that the phrase "damages re-
ceived" in § 104(a) (2) refers to damages received through legal actions or settle-
ments "based upon tort or tort-type rights."); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229
(1992), and the cases cited therein.
42 Andrews, supra note 29, at 759. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294,
1299, aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
43 Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
- Andrews, supra note 29, at 759.
- For a snapshot of the pre-Burke case law existing in the spring of 1992, see
Margaret Henning, Recent Developments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injury and
Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45 TAx LAw. 783 (1992). Henning's article describes
the struggle courts faced at that time in determining the parameters of the per-
sonal injury exclusion of § 104(a) (2), including how courts had analyzed the dis-
tinctions between physical and nonphysical injuries, compensatory and punitive
damages, personal and professional injuries, and personal and nonpersonal inju-
ries. The article also looks at the courts' treatment at that time of punitive dam-
age recoveries and employment-related recoveries, pointing to the marked
inconsistencies in treatment that parties were receiving. Henning asserts that
these inconsistencies stem from the absence of a clear explanation of the under-
lying policy of the statute. Many of these issues remain unresolved today, despite
the Burke decision, and the definitive policy explanation remains to be made.
46 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
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scope of section 104(a) (2) from the Supreme Court, and the
Court relied heavily on it in Schleier. Burke, therefore, has proved
to be an extremely important decision in determination of the
taxability of damages under the section, especially in the realm
of .nonphysical personal injury.47 Yet the Burke decision itself
has been confusing in its application.
The Seventh, Ninth, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal in
Downey, Schmitz, and Schleier, respectively, also relied heavily on
the test articulated in Burke in reaching their conclusions.48
Therefore, detailed examination of the Supreme Court's ration-
ale in Burke is critical both to analysis of the three opinions and
to the broader determination of the appropriateness of taxing
ADEA settlement awards.
D. UNZED STA TES V. BUKE
In United States v. Burke, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the disagreement existing at the time among the
courts of appeal as to whether Title VII backpay awards should
be excludable under section 104(a) (2).49 Burke held that back
pay awards in settlement of Title VII claims are not excludable'
from gross income under section 104(a) (2).'°
Burke involved allegations of unlawful discrimination based on
sex. Female employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) claimed that they were being denied salary increases on
the basis of their sex and in some cases, were even being sub-
jected to the lowering of salaries for the same reason. The Ten-
nessee Valley Authority chose to settle the suits and awarded the
47 For thorough pre-Schleier discussions of United States v. Burke and its impor-
tance in understanding § 104(a) (2), see Richard T. Helleloid & Lucretia S.W.
Mattson, Has the Scope of the Personal Injury Exclusion Been Changed by the Supreme
Court?, 77J. TAX'N 82 (1992); Carolyn F. Kolks, United States v. Burke--Does It
Definitively Resolve the Analytical Confusion Created by the Section 104(a)(2) Personal
Injury Exclusion?, 46 ARK. L. REv. 657 (1993); Cynthia A. Sciuto, Note, A Tort By
Any Other Name: Taxation of Non-Physical Personal Injury Damages After United States
v. Burke, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 285 (1993). These articles provide detailed insights
into Burke's impact on the types of nonphysical personal injury claims, other than
those associated with ADEA, on which this comment focuses.
48 See infra parts IV & V.
49 Burke, 504 U.S. at 232. To demonstrate the confusion,' the Court points to
the different results reached by the courts of appeals in Sparrow v. Commis-
sioner, 949 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1991); Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709
(4th Cir. 1989); and the Sixth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Burke, 929
F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1992), the opinion being reviewed at that time by the
Supreme Court. Burke, 504 U.S. at 233 n.3.
50 Id. at 238.
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employees varying sums calculated using a formula that factored
in length of service and pay rates.
The tax dispute involved in Burke arose when the respondents
claimed that their settlement payments fell within the section
104(a) (2) exclusion from taxability since they were "damages re-
ceived (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums
or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness." 51 The district court classified the settlement proceeds as
"back wages" and found that they could not be excluded be-
cause they were not 'damages received on account of personal
injuries."5 2 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 53 It
held that the exclusion rested on whether the injury and claim
are "personal and tort-like in nature;"54 if so, the award was not
taxable.5 5 In the. TVA employees' case, the Sixth Circuit held
that the discrimination the employees suffered was personal and
tort-like. Therefore, it held that under section 104(a) (2),
backpay damages granted under Title VII were excludable.56 In
the process, the court rejected the Commissioner's argument
that the circumscribed range of damages available under Title
VII distinguished it from other statutes providing relief for per-
sonal injuries.57
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and handed down its
opinion on May 26, 1992. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority
opinion (joined by six other justices), in which the Court an-
nounced its reversal of the court of appeals' finding that the
ADEA damages received by the employees were excludable.58
In writing for the. Court, Blackmun began by confirming that,
under the Internal Revenue Code, gross income is properly con-
strued broadly for taxation purposes to mean "all income from
whatever source derived" 59 that does not qualify for exclusion
under a specific code provision. 60 He then turned to section
.' I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 1994) (quoted in Burke, 504 U.S. at 232).
52 Burke, 504 U.S. at 232.
53 Burke v. Commissioner, 929 F.2d 110, 119 (2nd Cir. 1991).
54 Id. at 1121.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1123.
57 Id. at 1121-23.
58 Burke, 504 U.S. at 242. Those joining in the majority opinion were Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Justices Scalia and
Souter filed separate concurring opinions. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 248.
59 Id. at 233 (citing I.R.C. § 61(a)).
6 Id.
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104(a) (2), the exception in question, and began the process of
determining its scope.
To that end, he first noted that I.R.S. regulations had, since
1960, "formally... linked identification of a personal injury for
purposes of Section 104(a) (2) to traditional tort principles."61
To determine what these traditional tort principles were, Black-
mun looked to the writings of tort scholars Prosser and Keeton,
who define a "tort" as a "civil wrong, other than breach of con-
tract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of
an action for damages."62 Blackmun then cited R.V.F. Heus-
ton's statements that "an action for damages* [is] an essential
characteristic of every true tort," and that "it is solely by virtue of
the right to damages that the wrong complained of is to be
classed as a tort."6" From these, Blackmun and the Burke major-
ity concluded that "one of the hallmarks of traditional tort liabil-
ity is the availability of a broad range of damages to compensate
the plaintiff... fairly for injuries caused by violation of his legal
rights. '64 That conclusion provided the groundwork for the
Burke Court's establishment of a test based on the nature of the
remedial scheme included in the statute involved, which the
Court believed would serve as the proper indicator of the nature
of the claims.65
The Burke Court then confirmed the court of appeals' use of
the "nature of the underlying claim" test, but stated that, under
the correct method of analysis outlined in the opinion, the
court of appeals should have judged what that nature was by
examining the remedial scheme of Title VII. 66 At the time of
the Burke plaintiffs' injury,67 the Court notes, Title VII remedies
61 Id. at 234 (quoting 25 Fed. Reg. 11,490 (1960); 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c)
(1991)). Justice Blackmun included the oft-quoted language of Threlkeld v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988), where the
court stated, "The essential element of an exclusion under section 104(a) (2) is
that the income involved must derive from some sort of tort claim against the
payor....." Threlheld 87 T.C. at 1305.
62 Burke, 504 U.S. at 234 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAw OF TORTS 2 (1984)).
63 Id. (citing R. V. F. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS 9 (12th ed.
1957)).
64 Burke, 504 U.S. at 235 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978)).
65 Andrews, supra note 29, at 765.
66 Burke, 504 U.S. at 245.
67 As the Court notes, Title VII was significantly amended by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991; Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 1745, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Burke, 504 U.S. at
238 n.8. However, all parties recognized that those amendments did not apply to
the case at bar since they occurred subsequent to the injuries. Id.
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were limited to "back pay, injunctions, and other equitable re-
lief."68 The Court found this remedial scheme dissimilar to
those statutorily available to victims of other types of physical or
nonphysical personal injuries for "other traditional harms asso-
ciated with personal injuiry," such as pain and suffering, emo-
tional distress, or harm to reputation.69 Therefore, the Court
stated, " [T] he circumscribed remedies available under Title VII
stand in marked contrast not only to those available under tradi-
tional tort law, but under other federal antidiscrimination stat-
utes, as well." 70 Since Congress "declined to recompense Title
VII plaintiffs for anything beyond the wages properly due them,"
the remedial scheme was not broad and tort-like and the dam-
ages were not excludable from gross income under section
104(a) (2).71
While Burke is a Title VII case, it is considered, as noted
above-along with the more recent decision in Schleier-as the
Supreme Court's most definitive ruling on the section 104(a) (2)
exception. The Court's reasoning in Burke figured heavily into
Schleier, it was against the background of Burke that Schleier's
claim of exclusion and the broader issue of taxability of damages
awarded under the ADEA were considered. The remedial
scheme test set forth in Burke also figured heavily into the rea-
soning of the three circuit cases (the Seventh, the Ninth, and
the Fifth, described below) involved in the ADEA dispute ex-
isting prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Schleier. Burke re-
mains an important part of the landscape of the debate over the
taxability of ADEA damages and of the high Court's view of the
section 104(a) (2) exclusion.
68 Burke, 504 U.S. at 238. The Court looked to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g) (Supp.
III 1991) to determine what remedies were available prior to the 1991 amend-
ment of the section noted supra note 67. See also Are Age Discrimination Awards
Excludable? 76 J. Accr. (No. 3) Sept. 1993, at 1, which describes the remedies
available to Title VII plaintiffs as consisting of back pay and court orders forcing
an employer to rehire, hire, or promote an employee.
69 Burke, 504 U.S. at 239.
70 Id. at 240.
71 Id. at 241. It is important to note here that Justice O'Connor, who was
joined by Justice Thomas, registered a significant dissent in Schleier, which is dis-
cussed at length below. See infra notes 254-69 and accompanying text. Scalia's
Burke concurrence, also of importance, is likewise considered below. See infra
notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
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III. PRE-BURKE INTERPRETATION OF THE SECTION
104(a) (2) EXCEPTION IN ADEA AWARDS
A. BACKGROUND
At the time of the Supreme Court's decision to grant certio-
rari in Schleier, age discrimination damages had evolved into a
major battleground for the section 104(a) (2) debate, as the dif-
ferent views as to the taxability of ADEA damages expressed by
the Seventh, Ninth, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals demon-
strated.7 2 Some fundamental understanding of the ADEA and
of a pair of highly significant pre-Burke cases involving age dis-
crimination damages is important in assessing the reasoning of
the Ninth and Seventh Circuits in the opposite conclusions they
reached, as well as the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the taxa-
bility of ADEA damages.
B. TBE AGE DISCIUMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 196773
1. Stated Purpose of the Act
The Act's purpose is "to promote employment of older per-
sons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact
of age on employment." 74
The ADEA's legislative history indicates that Congress recog-
nized that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act did not adequately
address what Congress perceived to be a major problem: age
discrimination. Therefore, Congress directed the Secretary of
Labor to study the area. From that study came the ADEA.75
2. Types of Remedies Available Under the Statute
The ADEA incorporates remedies available in the Fair Labor
Standards Act,76 which provides for liquidated damages and the
doubling of back pay for cases of willful violations.77 Section
626(b) of the ADEA also allows the courts to grant "such legal
72 Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994); Schmitz v. Commis-
sioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994); Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 119 (5th
Cir. 1994) (per curiam), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
73 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
74 Id.
75 29 U.S.C. § 621, Interpretive Notes and Decisions.
76 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1988) (incorporated into the ADEA at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1994)).
77 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
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and equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the pur-
poses of the ADEA, including without limitation judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or en-
forcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section. ' 8
C. TAX TREATMENT OF SIGNIFICANT AkDEA-BASED DAMAGE
AWARDs PRIOR TO BUIRKE
Two ADEA cases representative of pre-Burke ADEA analysis
are Rickel v. Commissioner7 and Pistillo v. Commissioner.s0 In
Rickel, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the entire
amount of an ADEA settlement was excludable.8 1 The court
found that the damages arose from discrimination, and the fact
that the consequences (lost wages) were not personal did not
remove the personal nature of the discrimination claim.82
In Pistillo, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff's age discrimination settlement under the ADEA was
excludable under section 104(a) (2). Citing Rickel, the court
found that Pistillo's loss of wages, while nonphysical, did not
turn the age discrimination into a non-personal injury.84 Ac-
cording to the court, Pistillo suffered the same type of injury as
does a typical tort victim who is physically injured and receives a
settlement as a result.85
The judicial interpretation of section 104(a) (2) in the ADEA
context by the Rickel and Pistillo courts, along with the remedial
scheme of the ADEA itself, are important foundations for exam-
ining the majority opinions in the two cases handed down the
same day, Downey v. Commissioner and Schmitz v. Commissioner,
and the concurring opinion in Schmitz. Understanding those
background matters is also necessary for understanding the
Fifth Circuit's holding in Commissioner v. Schleier, which led to
the grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court. This comment
now turns its examination to these circuit opinions.
78
'Heen, supra note 29, at 587.
79 900 F.2d 655, 660-61 (3d Cir. 1990).
80 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1990).
81 Ricke, 900 F.2d at 660-61.
82 Id.
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IV. THE THREE POSITIONS EXPRESSED IN DOWNEY
AND SCHMITZ IN THE AUGUST 30, 1994,




The Downey and Schmitz decisions came down on the same
day, August 30, 1994. Immediately, it was predicted that this
split in opinions might bring about the long-needed Supreme
Court review of taxability of ADEA damages. 6
The two cases may have seemed particularly well-suited to trig-
ger such high court review because of their remarkable factual
and legal similarity. Both involve former United Airlines pilots
who received back pay and liquidated damages in settlements
under the ADEA. Both cases address a question left open by the
Supreme Court in Burke. may damages or settlements awarded
pursuant to the ADEA be excluded under section 104(a) (2)?",
Although the courts reach opposite conclusions, both use the
Burke analysis to reach their holdings. 88 This comment consid-
ers the Downey and Schmitz opinions in this section and examines
the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Schleier in Part V.
B. OPINION OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT IN DOWAzY V.
COMAISsIONe:R (JUDGE JOEL M. FLAUM)
In Downey, United Airlines forced one of its employees, a pilot
named Burns Downey, to retire at the age of sixty. Downey filed
suit under the ADEA alleging age discrimination. Subse-
quently, the parties decided to settle for $120,000, labeling half
of the settlement money "back pay" and the other half of it "liq-
uidated damages."89
86 Ninth and Seventh Circuits Reach Opposite Holdings on Tax Treatment of Age Bias
Damages, EMPLOYMENT POL'Y L. & DAILY (BNA), at d9 (Sept. 6, 1994), available in
Westlaw, BNA-EPLD database [hereinafter Opposite Holdings].
87 See Are Age Discrimination Awards Excludable? , supra note 68, at 1.
88 Both holdings apply only to punitive damages received prior to June 10,
1989, the effective date of the 1989 amendment to § 104(a) (2) which disallowed
exclusion of nonphysical injury punitive damages, as noted in the Ninth Circuit's
opinion and in Opposite Holdings, supra note 86. This fact does not mean, how-
ever, that the cases will have no implications for post-1989 airline liability and
pilot awards, because it is currently unclear how punitive damages will be treated
in the wake of Schleier. See infra part VII.
89 Downey, 33 F.3d at 837.
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Downey and his wife paid taxes on the $60,000 back pay half
of the settlement. The IRS filed a deficiency notice against
them for the liquidated damages portion, and the Downeys filed
in tax court for a redetermination of the assessment, claiming
that they should have been exempted from taxes on both the
back pay and the liquidated damages portions of the settlement.
The case brought squarely before the tax court the issue of
whether settlement payments pursuant to an ADEA lawsuit fall
within the section 104(a) (2) exception to taxable income.90
The Downey tax court waited for issuance of United States v,
Burke so that it could make its decision relying on the Supreme
Court's ruling in that case.91 After the Burke opinion was
handed down, the tax court looked to that opinion to hold that
"(1) the ADEA 'evidenced a tort-like conception of injury and
remedy' for purposes of Burke, and (2) all of the Downeys' dam-
ages received through their ADEA litigation were excludable
from tax."92
However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the tax court, holding
that the damages the Downeys received under the ADEA were
taxable income because an ADEA settlement does not compen-
sate for a tort-like injury, which Burke requires in order for the
recipient to be able to use the section 104(a) (2) exclusion.9"
Writing for the court, Judge Joel Flaum looked to Burke for its
interpretation of section 104(a) (2).94 He first stated that the
text of that section indicated that the taxable character of a set-
tlement payment must be the same as it would have been had
the payment arisen from an award on the underlying claim.95
Therefore, wrote Flaum, the court "must analyze the character
of the damages available under an ADEA suit."96
Flaum looked at the language of section 104, which limits the
exception to "damages received.., on account of personal inju-
ries or sickness."97 Laying the foundation for his ultimate con-
clusion, Flaum started his analysis by citing with favor Justice
Scalia's statement in his Burke concurrence that the'plain lan-
guage of section 104 indicated that only damages to an individ-
go Id. at 838.
91 Id. at 837.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 840.
94 Id. at 838.
95 Id. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 229, 245.
96 Downey, 33 F.3d at 838.
97 I.R.C. § 104(a) (2), quoted in Downey, 33 F.3d at 838.
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ual's physical or mental health should be excluded.9 8 Flaum
then looked to Treasury Regulation 1.104-1(c), which inter-
preted the term "damages" in section 104(a)(2) "to mean an
amount received through prosecution or settlement of an action
based on tort or tort-type rights."99
Flaum noted that, while the issue of whether ADEA claims are
tort-like is one of first impression in the Seventh Circuit, it had
been analyzed by other courts of appeals. 100 Flaum stated, how-
ever, that those cases were inconsistent with Burke's later analy-
sis, which he and the majority chose to apply as the "most
pertinent teaching on this matter."1 ''
Turning then to Burke, Flaum wrote:
Burke teaches us that the hallmark of tort liability is the availabil-
ity of a broad range of damages to compensate the plaintiff for inju-
ries caused by the violation, of a legal right, and while such
damages often are described in compensatory terms, tort dam-
ages usually "redress intangible elements of injury."102
Therefore, in the court's view, Burke reduced the case before
it to a question of whether the ADEA "provide [s] compensatory
damages for those intangible elements of injury essential to a
personal injury tort action.' 0° Flaum gave examples of that type
of compensatory damages, such as pain and suffering, emo-
tional distress, or personal humiliation. 104
The Downey court then analyzed the character of ADEA dam-
ages available. It noted that, under the ADEA, one cannot re-
cover for pain and suffering or emotional distress; therefore, the
court found that the range of remedies was not broad enough to
meet the Burke "hallmark of tort liability" test.'0 5 In comparing
the ADEA scheme to the Title VII remedies available at the time
of the Burke decision, Flaum stated that, " [w] ith respect to reme-
dies, the only difference between a scheme embodied under the
ADEA and that under Title VII is that under the ADEA a plain-
tiff may often recover liquidated damages in addition to lost
98 Downey, 33 F.3d at 838; see Burke, 504 U.S. at 242 (Scalia, J., concurring).
99 Downey, 33 F.3d at 838.
100 Id. Flaum pointed to Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d. Cir. 1990),
Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990), and Redfield v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1991). Downey, 33 F.3d at 838.
101 Downey, 33 F.3d at 838.
102 Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 840.
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wages when the employer's violation of the statute has been will-
ful. 1 0 6 He then took the position that, since liquidated dam-
ages were a replacement for prejudgment interest, a type of
contract remedy, they did not compensate for the "intangible ele-
ments of a tort-type injury."1 0 7 Therefore, the Downey court held
that an ADEA suit "does not even clear the Treasury's low hur-
dle of being 'tort-type,' " and that the court was "bound by
Burke" to find the ADEA settlement damages taxable for that
reason. 10 8 Since the ADEA does not provide a wide range of
compensatory damages for tort-like injuries, which the Downey
court interpreted Burke as requiring, ADEA damages are not
ones that plaintiffs receive "on account of personal injuries or
sickness and are not excludable under Section 104(a) (2)." 101
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit found the damages taxable."
C. OPINION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN
SCAr'I-Z V. COMAMISSJOIVER (UDGE ALFRED GOODwN)
John Schmitz received $115,050 in a settlement arising from
an ADEA class action against United Airlines, his former ,em-
ployer. Half of the settlement was designated "back pay" and
the other half "liquidated damages."' 1
The Schmitzes initially reported only the back pay portion of
the income. The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency on
the rest of the award. Based on Rickel" 2 the Schmitzes filed a
claim for exclusion of the entire settlement."' The tax court
held the entire award excludable, and the Commissioner
appealed." 4
The issue before the Ninth Circuit in Schmitz was the same
one addressed by the Seventh Circuit in Downey: whether the
ADEA settlement amount was excludable under section
104(a) (2) . 5 To decide, the Schmitz court looked to the two-
part test the court had set forth earlier in the year in a case
106 Id. at 839.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 838, 839.
109 Id. at 840.
110 Id. at 839.
M Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 791.
112 Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
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called United States v. Hawkins.1 16 Under the Hawkins test, "a tax-
payer must show both (1) that the underlying cause of action
was tort-like within the meaning of United States v. Burke... and
(2) that the damages were received 'on account of' the tax-
payer's personal injury."'1 17
Judge Goodwin, writing for the Schmitz majority, applied the
Hawkins test to the case before it., First, the majority held that
the first prong of the test was satisfied because the ADEA cre-
ated tort-like causes of action as those are defined in Burke,'1 8
which the Schmitz court interpreted as recognizing that "discrim-
ination could constitute a 'personal injury' for purposes of [sec-
tion] 104(a)(2)."119 Goodwin then distinguished the remedial
scheme in Burke from the one under analysis in Schmitz. He
wrote that the ADEA's remedial scheme, unlike that of Title VII
(which was scrutinized in Burke), was broad enough to "evidence
a tort-like conception of remedy."1 2 0
The court found support for this distinction within the
ADEA's remedial scheme, which it noted provides for jury trials
and liquidated damages in cases of willful violations.1 21 The
court found additional support for its position in the fact that
most post-Burke courts have continued to find ADEA damages
excludable, despite the Supreme Court's more restrictive test.1 22
Furthermore, the court noted that "Burke does not require that
a statute provide the complete spectrum of tort remedies before
it may be deemed to redress a tort-type right;"1 23 therefore, the
court found, the ADEA does not have to provide damages for
emotional distress or pain and suffering in order to be charac-
terized as a tort-type remedy.12 4
Judge Goodwin also wrote that the case law and legislative his-
tory associated with the ADEA make it clear that ADEA liqui-
dated damages have a compensatory as well as a punitive
purpose.1 2 Therefore, as the Schmitz court saw it, the settlement
116 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792 (citing United States v. Hawkins, 30 F.3d 1077, 1083
(9th Cir. 1994)).
117 Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082.
118 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792.
119 Id. (quoting Burke, 504 U.S. at 239).
120 Id. at 793.
121 Id. at 792.
122 Id. at 792-93 (listing cases that have so held).
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damages under the ADEA do more than merely give plaintiffs
their due, as was the case in Title VII.126 The court stated that
because these compensatory liquidated damages and jury trials
are available under the ADEA and because discrimination is a
personal injury, the ADEA establishes a tort-like cause of action,
and the first prong of the Hawkins test is met.1 2 7
The Schmitz court then went on to consider the second prong
of the Hawkins test: whether the Schmitzes' damages were re-
ceived "on account of" personal injuries. 12' The Hawkins court
used this "on account of" language. to test for a compensatory
nature in damages; if the damages were received for personal
injury and not for the egregious conduct of the tortfeasor, then
they had the requisite compensatory nature. 121
In Schmitz, the Commissioner argued that this second prong
was not met because the liquidated damages were due to
United's misconduct, not the plaintiff's injuries; therefore, the
Commissioner argued, they were not compensatory, but puni-
tive.130 The majority disagreed. Goodwin looked to the plain
language of the ADEA remedial provisions (which are noted
above) and wrote that "the mere fact that liquidated damages
are available in cases of. 'willful' discrimination does not trans-
form them into punitive damages or eliminate their compensa-
tory purpose."131 The court stated that liquidated damages in
general, and in the Fair Labor Standards Act in particular, are
not punitive in nature, but compensatory and proportional to
the damages suffered by the plaintiff.132 Relying on the plain
language of the statute and on congressional intent, the court
stated that Congress used the term "liquidated" because it
126 Id.
127 Id. at 794.
128 Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080.
129 Id.
130 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 794.
131 Id. at 796. According to the Schmitz court, support for the assertion that
ADEA liquidated damages serve both a compensatory and a. deterrent function is
found in the Conference Report for the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA, which
states that, "[ADEA] liquidated damages (calculated as an amount equal to the
pecuniary loss) ... compensate the aggrieved party for nonpecuniary losses aris-
ing out of a willful violation of the ADEA," and "[t]he ADEA as amended by this
act does not provide remedies of a punitive nature." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 950,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., 13-14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 528, 535). The
court also provides at this point in the opinion a list of cases in support of its
assertion that "most courts recognize that ADEA liquidated damages serve both a
compensatory and a deterrent function." Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 796.
132 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 794-95.
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meant liquidated, not something else, and that its use of that
term was dispositive.I 33
Therefore, the Schmitz majority found that the second prong
of the Hawkins test was met and held that "[b] ecause ADEA liq-
uidated damages serve both to punish the employer and to com-
pensate the taxpayer for intangible losses, and because Congress
chose to label them 'liquidated' rather than 'punitive,' ADEA
liquidated damages are, from the taxpayer's perspective, dam-
ages received on account of personal injury. ' 13 4 Consequently,
the Schmitz court held that the liquidated damages in question
could be excluded under section 104(a) (2) 13' and that the
backpay could be excluded as well.136 The court reasoned that,
since the ADEA creates a tort-like cause of action, the result is
the exclusion of both categories under section 104(a) (2).137
D. CONCURRENCE IN SczAMrrz- COMMv. SSzOAR
(UDGE STEPHEN S. TROTT)
In a concurring opinion in Schmitz, Judge Trott agreed with
the majority that all ADEA settlement damages are excludable
under I.R.C. section 104(a) (2) .138 Trott disagreed, however,
with the majority's adoption of the two-part test from Hawkins,
which he felt improperly analyzed the suitability of a claim for
exclusion under section 104(a) (2) .13 He stated his view that
the determinative factor in questions of excludability was
"whether the ADEA redresses a tort-like personal injury
claim." 4 ' Based on his belief that ADEA causes of action are
tort-like, Trott agreed with the majority holding that no part of
the resulting awards should be taxed.'14  Trott then registered
his objection to the Hawkins test: in his opinion, the "on account
of" prong of that test forced the court to ignore, as the majority
did, many indicators 6f the punitive nature of the liquidated
damages provision of the ADEA if the court were to find that an
133 Id. at 795.
134 Id. at 796.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 794 n.4.
137 Id. at 794.
138 Id. at 796 (Trott, J., concurring).
139 Id. Judge Trott explained that he dissented in Hawkins based on his belief
that the Hawkins test was not the correct method of determining § 104a) (2)
excludability. Id.
14 Id. at 796-97 (TrottJ., concurring).
141 Id. at 797.
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age-related award under the ADEA was compensatory, and thus
excludable. 142
Trott proceeded to list some of these indicators that, to him,
evidenced the punitive nature of the liquidated damages pro-
vided for by the ADEA. He stated that the Ninth Circuit had
long treated liquidated damages as punitive damages, even
before the Supreme Court acknowledged their punitive charac-
ter.'43 Second, he noted that the legislative history reflected
congressional intent that the ADEA's liquidated damages provi-
sion served a punitive purpose.144 Finally, he asked why the stat-
ute would make a distinction between willful violations and
those where the violator lacked intent if the purpose of the dam-
ages was to compensate, not to punish, since all had suffered
"the same intangible or incalculable harm," regardless of
whether the violation was willful or not.145
As a result, Trott stated his belief that ADEA liquidated dam-
ages should be viewed and treated as punitives and, as punitive
damages, the Hawkins test would require they be taxed.'46 Yet
Trott concurred rather than dissented in Schmitz based on his
belief that Hawkins was wrongly decided on the taxability of pu-
nitive damages and that the court's bad decision in that case
forced the Schmitz majority to take a contorted view of ADEA
liquidated damages in order to avoid the undesired result of
nonexclusion. 147 Trott advocated a rethinking of the Hawkins
test so that the right result, in his opinion, concerning exclusion
of ADEA damages could be reached by Ninth Circuit courts
without such judicial maneuvering. 48
142 Id. at 797-98.
143 Id. (citing the following cases as examples of this Ninth Circuit position:
Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); Criswell v.
Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 556 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd 472 U.S. 400
(1985); and Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985)).
- Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 797-98. Trott referred to the view expressed by the
Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985),
that the fact that Congress chose not to incorporate the FLSA's criminal provi-
sion into the ADEA, replacing it instead with a liquidated damages award in cases
of "willful" violation of the ADEA, indicated Congress' intent that ADEA liqui-
dated damages be punitive in nature. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 797.
145 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 798..
146 Id. at 799.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 798-99.
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V. THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT IN
SCHLEIER V COMMISSIONER ON THE
TAXABILITY OF ADEA DAMAGES AND
THE SUBSEQUENT GRANT OF
CERTIORARI BY THE SUPREME COURT
A. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE AND FIFTH CIRCUIT OPINION
Erich E. Schleier, like Burns Downey and John Schmitz, was a
United Airlines pilot.14 9 He had been employed by the airline
for twenty years in 1979 when he was forced to retire at age sixty
under a mandatory retirement rule. 150 He and other United pi-
lots forced to retire under the rule filed suit for age discrimina-
tion, claiming the retirement requirement violated their rights
under the ADEA.5 In 1982, United agreed to settle with
Schleier and the other pilots involved, and in 1986, Schleier was
paid approximately $145,000, half of which was termed "back
pay" and the other half of which was "liquidated damages. 1 52
Schleier's tax battle over the damages began with his 1986 tax
return, in which he reported the back pay portion of the settle-
ment as taxable income but did not report the liquidated dam-
ages portion.15 3 He was informed by the Internal Revenue
Service that tax payment was required on the liquidated dam-
ages amount as well.154
Schleier took his case to the United States Tax Court.15
There, he sought a redetermination of the deficiency asserted
by the Commissioner.1 56 In his petition to the tax court,
Schleier claimed that the liquidated damages portion of the set-
tlement was properly excluded under section 104(a) (2) because
it was an award for damages received "on account of personal
injuries or sickness. 157 Schleier also sought a determination of
149 Denniston, supra note 16, at 9C.
15 Steve McGonigle, Supreme Court to Hear Pilot's Case Against IRS: Age Discrimi-
nation Victims Say Back Pay Should Not Be Taxed, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Nov. 15,
1994, at 4D. For a discussion of the Age Sixty Rule, see infra part VII.
151 Denniston, supra note 16, at9C.
152 McGonigle, supra note, 150, at 4D.
153 Supreme Court to Decide if Back Pay Awards Are Taxable, LIABILITY WEEK, Vol. 9,
No. 46, Nov. 21, 1994.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d
119 (5th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-5555) (per curiam) (describing the lower court pro-
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overpayment and a return of the taxes he had paid on the back
pay portion of the settlement; his petition to the court alleged
that, under section 104(a) (2), the back pay also qualified for
exclusion from gross income. 15
8
Disposition of Schleier's case was delayed pending a tax court
decision on Downey v. Commissioner."' In its original disposition
of that case, the Downey tax court held that both the back pay
and the liquidated damages portion of Downey's settlement
were excludable, and though the court subsequently agreed to
reconsider the Downey decision based on the Supreme Court's
just-released decision in Burke, the tax court reached the same
conclusion as it had originally, but this time on the Burke "na-
ture of the remedial scheme" grounds.16 0 The ADEA damages
were excludable. 161 Based on that ruling by the tax court in
Downey that the ADEA damages were wholly excludable, the tax
court granted summary judgment to Schleier in July 1993.162
The Commissioner appealed this decision to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Schleier v. Commissioner. 6  The Fifth Cir-
cuit's response left little room for doubt as to its position on the
issue of the taxability of ADEA awards. Understanding the Fifth
Circuit Court's response to the government's appeal in Schleier
requires looking back to 1993, the period during which the tax
court ruled for the second time on Downey.16 1
Shortly after the second post-Burke tax court holding of ex-
cludability, the Fifth Circuit was faced with an ADEA damages
issue in a case titled Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co.165 A
year later, when Schleierwas appealed to the Fifth Circuit, Purcell
proved to be the critical case in the Fifth Circuit's disposition of
Schleier.166 The court's reasoning in Purcell assumes particular
158 Id.
159 97 T.C. 150 (1991), supplemental opinion, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d
836 (7th Cir. 1994).
160 Petition for Certiorari at 4-5, Scheier (No. 93-5555). The tax court further
noted that the ADEA "evidences a tort-like conception of injury and remedy,"
since the liquidated damages provided for by the statute serve both a deterrent or
punitive purpose and compensate recipients for nonpecuniary losses. Id. at 6.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 No. 93-5555, (5th Cir. June 21, 1994) (per curiam), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2159
(1995). The Fifth Circuit chose to affirm without opinion, and its unpublished
decision in the case is referenced in a "Table of Decisions Without Reported
Opinions," 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994).
164 Petition for Certiorari at 6-7, Schleier (No. 93-5555).
165 999 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1993).
166 Sch/eier, No. 93-5555, slip op. at 2.
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significance given the manner in which the Fifth Circuit used
that decision in its Schleier opinion.
In Purcell, plaintiff Walter Purcell was replaced at age sixty as
manager of the trust department of Seguin State Bank and Trust
Company; his replacement was thirty-seven years old.1 67 Purcell
brought a claim of an ADEA violation 168 in federal district court,
and the jury there found for Purcell on the ADEA claim, award-
ing him $250,000 in damages for the Bank's violation. 169
The Bank then appealed the ADEAjudgment against it to the
Fifth Circuit.170 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury's finding of
age discrimination, but it reversed the jury's finding of willful-
ness, concluding that the award of damages was excessive, thus
remanding the case for further proceedings on those two
issues. 171
Most importantly, though, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
used the opportunity presented by Purcell to make an unequivo-
cal statement of its view on the issue of the taxability of ADEA
damages awards. Citing section 104(a) (2), the Purcell court
stated that, "[a] s far as income taxes are concerned, damages
awarded 'on account of personal injuries or sickness' are ex-
empt from federal income tax." 172 The court went on to incor-
porate the Supreme Court's Burke analysis into its reasoning,
noting that under its reading of that case, "[b] ack pay awards
are nontaxable when they redress a tort-like injury. When Title
VII awarded only backwages, it did not contemplate a tort-like
injury, and back pay awards under Tide VII were taxable."1 73
The Purcell court noted it had followed Burke in the Title VII
context to reflect the taxability of such awards in a prior case,
Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist.174
167 Purce, 999 F.2d at 953.
168 Purcell also asserted a claim of a violation of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA) and a state claim of self-compelled defamation. Id.
However, only the ADEA claim has significance in the context of Schleier.
169 Id. at 955. The jury, to reach its verdict, found that "1. Purcell was dis-
charged; 2. age was a 'determining' factor in Purcell's discharge; 3. the bank's
actions were willful; and 4. Purcell had sustained damages in the amount of
$250,000." Id. This is representative of -the findings commonly required in
ADEA causes of action.
170 Id. Purcell also cross-appealed the judgement reached by the district court
on the defamation claim, the claim on which the court granted the Bank judg-
ment as a matter of law. Id. at 953.
171 Id. at 962.
172 Id. at 960.
173 Id. (citing Burke, 504 U.S. at 239-40).
174 869 F.2d 1565, 1580 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
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Yet the Purcell court perceived a critical difference between
the Title VII cases and Purcell. Palpably shifting its analysis as it
turns to the ADEA, the court stated, "[n] either Burke nor John-
ston, however, involved the ADEA. The Third, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeal view the ADEA as redressing a tort-like
injury."17 5 Citing Jay v. International Salt Co.,17 6 it continued, "We
have held that age discrimination is a tort claim for purposes of
calculating the statute of limitations."177
Then, referring to the post-Burke supplemental decision of
the tax court in Downey v. Commissioner,178 the Purcell court wrote:
Recently, the Tax Court reconsidered this issue in. light of Burke,
holding that ADEA claims are tort-like and that an entire ADEA
award is nontaxable. Applying Downey, we find the evidence prop-
erly presented a lost earnings amount net of tax. Increasing the
award to reflect tax liability is improper.179
The Fifth Circuit, therefore, adopted the reasoning set forth in
the Downey tax court decision and held that Purcell's ADEA
award (whatever it might ultimately amount to after reconsider-
ation of the award on remand) was indeed excludable under
section 104(a) (2).180
What gives Purcell particular significance is the way the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals chose to dispose of the Commissioner's
appeal of the tax court's decision in Schleier. The Fifth Circuit
Court handed down its decision on the Commissioner's appeal
on June 21, 1994, prior to the Seventh Circuit's reversal of Dow-
ney on August 30, 1994.181 As noted in the Petition for Certio-
rari, which followed the court's ruling on the appeal, "[t]he
threejudge panel assigned to [the] case ... entered a decision
in favor of respondent solely on the authority of Purcell."1 8
2
175 Purcell, 999 F.2d at 961. The court cites Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991); Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th
Cir. 1990); and Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990). Purcell 999
F.2d at 960.
176 868 F.2d 179, 180 (5th Cir. 1989).
177 Purcel4 999 F.2d at 961.
178 97 T.C. 150 (1991), supplemental opinion, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d
836 (7th Cir. 1994).
179 Purcell 999 F.2d at 961 (citations omitted).
180 Id.
is1 As noted above, on that same day, August 30, 1994, the Ninth Circuit
handed down the opposite opinion on taxability of ADEA damages in Schmitz v.
Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994).
182 Petition for Certiorari at 7, Schleier (No. 93-5555) (emphasis added).
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How strongly the court apparently felt that the taxability issue
presented in Schleier was already decided in the Fifth Circuit is
reflected in the form of the opinion it issued when the case
came before it. The per curiam opinion, in its entirety, is one
paragraph long,18 3 and the court chose to invoke a local rule
allowing non-publication when an opinion has "no precedential
value and merely decides particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law."1 4
The core of the Fifth Circuit's opinion lies in a few concise
sentences. After a brief recital of Schleier's tax status and the
procedural history of the case, the court summarily dismissed
the Commissioner's appeal, writing:
The United States Tax Court concluded that the entire settle-
ment under the ADEA was excludable from Schleier's income
pursuant to Section 104(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code. 26
U.S.C. § 104(a)(2). The government appeals. We have already
decided the issue. Money recovered under the ADEA is excluda-
ble from income for the purposes of taxation. Purcell v. Seguin
Bank and Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1993). We AFFIRM.' 85
One tax commentator, capturing the Fifth Circuit's tone, de-
scribed this cursory decision based on Purcell as an opinion "with
curtness that should suggest to the IRS it shouldn't bother ap-
pealing ADEA cases to the Fifth Circuit anymore."8 6 Seemingly,
the Fifth Circuit attempted to send a strong signal that the issue
of taxability of ADEA damages was settled in its jurisdiction.
B. GRANT OF CERTIORARI BY THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
The Solicitor General, however, did not feel the same. The
Fifth Circuit opinion was, of course, only one viewpoint in a
183 Schleier, No. 930-5555. A copy of the opinion is on file with the SMU LAw
REVIEW ASSOCIATION.
184 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1 provides, "The publication of opinions that have no prec-
edential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled prin-
ciples of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." The court noted this rule in a footnote in its decision in Schleier,
adding, "Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published." Sch/eier, No. 93-5555, slip op. at 1.
185 Schlier, No. 93-5555, slip op. at 2. Note that the Schmitz court also relied to
some degree on the Downey tax court's post-Burke reasoning, making that deci-
sion likely to come under consideration as part of the Supreme Court's analysis
in its hearing of Schleier.
186 Robert J. Wells, Age Discrimination Awards: Cases From the Friendly Skies, 94
TAX NOTES TODAY 201-03 (Oct. 13, 1994).
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widening split among circuits. So, on September 19, 1994, the
Solicitor General petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari to provide the Court the opportunity to
determine whether Schleier was correctly decided.2187
In her petition, the Solicitor General described the proce-
dural history and the current posture of Schleier'88 and stated the
question presented as " [w] hether back pay and liquidated dam-
ages received in settlement of litigation under the Age Disca-imi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967 are excluded from gross
income under Section 104(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code
as 'damages received... on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness.' "189 The petition then describes the growing split among
circuits, noting specifically the conflicting interpretations in the
Seventh, Ninth, and the Fifth Circuits' of United States v. Burke
and of the tax court's subsequent holding in Downey.190
In support of her request that the Supreme Court grant the
hearing, the Commissioner gave two reasons. First, the petition
stated that, "[a]bsent further review by this Court, these conflict-
ing understandings of Burke by the Courts of Appeal will result
in disparate tax treatment of otherwise identically situated tax-
payers (including the many parties who participated in the same
class action settlement of the United Airlines ADEA litiga-
tion). " " Second, the petition noted that "[t]he proper treat-
ment of ADEA recoveries . . . under Section 104(a) (2) of the
Internal Revenue Code represents a recurring question of sub-
stantial administrative importance."'92 The petition continued,
"The issues addressed in this case affect many thousands of indi-
viduals who have received, or will receive in the future, damage
awards under the ADEA and other state and federal statutory
schemes."'' 93
As did her formulation of the statement of the question
presented, the Solicitor General's second rationale suggested
that a Supreme Court ruling would have implications broader
than an impact on tax reporting of age discrimination damage
awards. 194 She indicated that a Supreme Court holding would
187 Petition for Certiorari, Scheier (No. 93-5555).
188 Id. at 3-4.
189 Id. at 1.
190 Id. at 8-9.
191 Id. at 7.
192 Id.,at 7.
193 Id.
194 Denniston, supra note 16, at 9C.
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also affect discrimination cases in a variety of other federal and
state contexts.
195
In Respondents' Brief in opposition to the granting of certio-
rari by the Supreme Court,19 6 Schleier's attorneys first disagreed
with what they termed the Solicitor General's "unsubstantiated
allegations that the issues in this case 'affect many thousands of
individuals who have received, or Will receive in the future, damage
awards under the ADEA and other state and federal statutory
schemes." 97 The attorneys argued that the applicability to
those beyond Schleier and others in the class action suit was
"speculative," especially given the change in the tax code con-
tained in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.198
The respondents, therefore, tried to narrow the scope of the
projected impact of a Supreme Court decision.
The Respondents' Brief proceeded to explain why the peti-
tioners' writ should be denied. 19 9 First, the respondents as-
serted that the Burke test had been correctly applied in the Fifth
Circuit's decision because the range of ADEA damages was suffi-
ciently broad, and therefore review was not warranted.2 0 0 Sec-
ond, the respondents argued that the Supreme Court is not the
right forum in which to settle the Internal Revenue Service's in-
terpretive problems with section 104(a) (2). Instead, the respon-
dents asserted that "in the interest of judicial economy," the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service should "formal-
ize her position through rulemaking or other appropriate ad-
ministrative proceedings. '20 1 Third, the respondents argued
that the passage of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act in 1989
would limit the impact of a decision and would thereby give a
Supreme Court decision "little continuing significance" since
the issues involved in Schleier's case arose under pre-1989 tax
law. 202
195 Id.
196 On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit: Brief for Respondents in Opposition, Schleier v. Commis-
sioner, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995) (No. 94-500) microformed on, U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs (Congressional Information Service) [hereinafter Brief in
Opposition]..
197 Id. at 2.
198 Id. at 3.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 3-7.
201 Id. at 7.
202 Id. at 10.
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In a Reply Brief to the Respondent's Brief,2"' the Solicitor
General, as petitioner, disagreed with the respondents' view on
each of the three points asserted. First, the Solicitor General
argued that the case did have significance; without resolution,
she asserted, determinations of taxability under section
104(a) (2) would, in light of the existing split in circuits, depend
on the "happenstance of geography."20 4 Second, argued the So-
licitor General, a new interpretation through rulemaking might
be accorded uncertain deference (as section 104(a) (2) cur-
rently is) and "could not obtain equal treatment for the various
litigants now before the Court," whose claims, while similar,
were inconsistently addressed by lower courts. 20 5 Third, con-
cerning the 1989 amendment, the Solicitor General stated that
many issues remained unsettled despite that amendment's pas-
sage, including the excludability of back pay and liquidated
damages under the ADEA (since back pay was not a punitive
damage and liquidated damages were not awarded "on account
of" any personal injury, as the statute requires for exclusion, but
instead to deter "willful violations" of the ADEA).206
Considering the assertions of both the Solicitor General and
the respondents is important since the Supreme Court granted
the petitioner's writ for certiorari without comment, thereby not
revealing its specific motivation in deciding to hear Schleier or
the scope of the issue it sought to address in hearing the case.
At the time the Court agreed to hear the case, interest in the
Court's resolution in legal and taxation circles was great; this
fact was evident in the numerous reports of the grant of certio-
rari in legal, taxation, and more general news sources. 0 7
203 On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Schleier v. Comm'P, 115 S. Ct.
2159 (1995) [hereinafter Reply Brief].
204 Id. at 2.
205 Id. at 3.
206 Id. at 1-2.
207 See, e.g., Supreme Court Agrees to Review Tax Treatment of Age Bias Settlement,
DAILY L . REP. (BNA), at 218 d3 (Nov. 15, 1994), available inWestlaw BNA-DLR
database; Laurie Asseo, Justices Take Case Involving Tax on Verdicts: Age Bias Suit at
Issue, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 3, 1994, at 11; Marlis L. Carson, Supreme
Court Will Rule on Excludability of Damages Received Under ADEA, 94 TAx NOTES
TODAY 223-2 (Nov. 15, 1994); Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Sets Aside Ruling on
N.Y Professor's Speech Rights, WAsH. POST, Nov. 15, 1994, at A7; News, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Nov. 14, 1994, at 3C; Denniston, supra note 16, at 9C; McGonigle, supra
note 150, at 4D.
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VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE: SCHLE1ER
V. COMMISSIONER
A. OVERVIEW
Schleier was argued before the Supreme Court on March 27,
1995, and the Court handed down its decision a few months
later on June 14.208 Called by Court watchers "the most impor-
tant federal tax case of the term"20 9 and "much-anticipated, '" 210
the Supreme Court's decision resolved the circuit split by ruling
that damages recovered in ADEA claims are taxable income
under I.R.C. section 104(a) (2).11
For many informed about the issue, the holding came as a
surprise. As lawyer and taxation specialist Robert W. Wood212
noted a few weeks after the opinion came down:
Many employment lawyers, tax lawyers, and accountants have
been waiting for the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the split in
circuit courts concerning the tax treatment of recoveries under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In mid-June, the
[C] ourt ruled in Commissioner v. Schleier... that ADEA recoveries
are taxable. Many people-including me-had predicted that
the Supreme Court would go the other way. 213
"After all," he continued, "the majority of the circuit courts
had concluded that ADEA recoveries were non-taxable; only the
Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals had held to the con-
trary."214 As further grounds for the belief he and others had
that 'the Supreme Court would find the damages excludable,
Wood pointed to decisions and rulings of the last few years sug-
gesting that "a goodly number of statutory claims like those
under the ADEA would fit within", the section 104(a)(2) per-
sonal injury exclusion; Revenue Ruling 93-88 and the explicit
ruling by the IRS that recoveries for Title VII gender and racial
discriminatory acts would not be viewed as income to the claim-
ant; and finally, the Supreme Court's "suggestion" in Burke that
08 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
209 Taxation and Federal Procedure U.S.L.W. No. 64, at 3079 (Aug. 8, 1995).
210 Gary D. Friedman & Harvey P. Sanders, Schleier Leaves Taxing Questions Un-
answered, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 1995, Outside Counsel at 1.
211 Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2163.
212 Wood authored a textbook, ROBERT W. WOOD, TAXATION OF DAMAGE
AWARDs AND SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS (1991 & Supp. 1995).
213 Robert W. Wood, Taxing Definitions for Types of Harm; Supreme Court Ruling
on Age Discrimination Recoveries Narrows the Income Exclusion for Personal Injury
Awards, THE REcoRDER, June 27, 1995, at 8.
214 Id.
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Title VII recoveries for race and gender violations would "proba-
bly be excludable."215
Yet the Supreme Court found the ADEA settlement damages
received by Erich Schleier taxable. To shed light on the Court's
reasoning, the majority and dissenting opinions are set forth in
this section; in the section that follows, commentators' views on
the decision and its anticipated impact, as well as other potential
implications of the Court's holding, are examined.
B. MAJoRrIY OPINION OF THE SC1w- I COURT JUSTICE JOHN
PAUL STEVENS)
After laying out the issue ("whether § 104(a) (2) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code authorizes a taxpayer to exclude from his
gross income the amount received in settlement of a claim for
backpay and liquidated damages under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967")216 the facts, and the procedural
history of the case, Stevens stated the holding and set forth
three grounds for it. He wrote, "Our consideration of the plain
language of [section] 104(a), the text of the regulation implementing
[section] 104(a)(2), and our reasoning in Burke convinces us that a
recovery under the ADEA is not excludable from gross in-
come."21 7 The Court then proceeded to explain those grounds,
including an examination of Schleier's argument as to each.
First, the Court looked to the Internal Revenue Code to ex-
plain its view that the plain language of section 104(a) (2) sup-
ported the Court's holding that ADEA damages were taxable.
Before reaching section 104, though, Stevens laid the ground-
work for the majority's narrow reading of that section by ac-
knowledging the "broad" definition of "gross income" in section
61 (a) and noting, "We have repeatedly emphasized the 'sweep-
ing scope' of this section and its statutory predecessors." 218  He
continued by recognizing what he called the "corollary to Sec-
tion 61(a)'s broad construction," namely, the "default rule of
statutory interpretation that exclusions from income must be
narrowly construed." 219  These interpretive presumptions
215 Id.
216 Schleier 115 S. Ct. at 2161.
217 Id. at 2163 (emphasis added).
218 Id. at 2163 (citing Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429
(1955). See also United States v.Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992); Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331 (1940)).
219 Id. Stevens again cites to Burke for support, this time pointing to Justices
Souter's and Scalia's concurring opinions.
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formed the foundation of the Court's position on the taxability
of the settlement before it.
Turning its attention next to section 104 of the Code, the
Court acknowledged Schleier's assertion that his settlement fell
within the section 104(a) (2) "on account of personal injuries or
sickness" exception to the sweeping definition of gross in-
come.22 ° The Court's response was direct: "In ofir view, the
plain language of the statute undermines respondent's conten-
tion." 2 21 To demonstrate the flaw in the respondent's position,
Stevens used a hypothetical in which he painted a picture of a
taxpayer who is injured in an automobile accident and as a re-
sult of that injury suffers "(a) medical expenses, (b) lost wages,
and (c) pain, suffering, and emotional distress that cannot be
measured with precision. ' 222 The taxpayer receives a settlement
of $30,000 for those damages. The entire amount of that settle-
ment, Stevens reasoned, would be excludable because both the
damages (medical and pain and suffering) and the back wages
were clearly "on account of personal injuries. '22 3 To explain the
significance of this example of a common section 104(a) (2) ex-
ception, Stevens wrote:
The critical point this hypothetical illustrates is that each ele-
ment of the settlement is recoverable not simply because the tax-
payer received a tort settlement, but rather because -each
element of the settlement satisfies the requirement set forth in
104(a) (2) . . . that the damages were received "on account of
personal injuries or sickness.224
In contrast, the Court did not view either part of Schleier's
claim as falling within the section 104(a) (2) exception. The
majority first stated that the back wages portion of Schleier's re-
covery did not qualify because "it does not satisfy the critical re-
quirement of being 'on account of personal injury or
sickness.' ",225 Unlike the automobile accident hypothetical, a
situation the Court described as one in which "the accident
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 2163-64.
223 Id. at 2164. As to the back wages, Stevens noted, "as long as the lost wages
resulted from time in which the taxpayer was out of work as a result of her inju-
ries." Id. He directed the reader at this point to Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
1294 (1986), another pivotal case discussed above.
224 Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2164.
225 Id. (emphasis added).
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causes a personal injury which in turn causes a loss of wages, 226
" [i] n age discrimination, the discrimination causes both per-
sonal injury and loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other.
The amount of back wages recovered is completely independent
of the existence or extent of any personal injury."2 27 Therefore,
the Court held that exclusion of that portion of the settlement
was not permitted under the plain language of section
104(a) (2) because the recovery of back wages was not "on ac-
count of" personal injury, and because the amount recovered
was not affected by. personal injury to the one suffering age
discrimination.
Schleier also argued, however, that the liquidated damages
portion of the settlement fit within the plain language of section
104(a) (2) since the Court had, in an earlier FLSA case, deemed
that liquidated damages were not punishment, but compensa-
tion for "damages too obscure and difficult of proof to esti-
mate."228 He asserted that Congress must be presumed to have
known of that decision and thus have intended to accord liqui-
dated damages granted for obscure injuries that same compen-
satory nature when it incorporated FLSA's liquidated damages
provision into the ADEA. 29
The Court, however, found two weaknesses in Schleier's argu-
ment. First, the Court asserted that Congress could indeed have
known of the interpretation given FLSA's liquidated damages by
the Court and still not interpreted the "obscure" injuries de-
scribed in the opinion to refer to personal injuries. 3 ° Second,
and "more importantly," according to the majority, the Court
had already rejected Schleier's argument and concluded that
"the liquidated damages provisions of the ADEA were a signifi-
cant departure from those in the FLSA."23 1 Stevens continued,
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. (quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84
(1942)).
229 Id.
230 Id. at 2165.
231 Id. The court cites to Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 574 (1978), and then to
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126 (1985), a case in which
the Supreme Court heard, according to a footnote in Stevens' opinion, "many of
the arguments offered by respondent today." SchLeier, 115 S. Ct. at 2165 n.5.
Given that similarity, the Schleier majority wrote, "Against this background, the
Court's statement that 'Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive
in nature' can only be taken as a rejection of the argument that those damages
are also (or are exclusively) compensatory." Id.
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"[A] nd we explicitly held in Thurston: 'Congress intended for
liquidated damages to be punitive in nature.' "232 He con-
cluded that the Court's holding in Thurston necessitated the
conclusion that "liquidated damages under the ADEA, like back
wages under the ADEA, are not received on account of personal
injury or sickness. "233
The Supreme Court then moved to its second stated reason
for rejecting the respondent's assertion that his ADEA damages
should be excluded from taxation: section 1.1.04-1(c) of the
Treasury Regulations,23 4 the Commissioner's interpretation of
I.R.C. section 104(a) (2). As the Court noted, that treasury reg-
ulation states that, in section 104(a) (2)'s exclusion of "damages
received.., on account of personal injuries or sickness[,] [t]he
term 'damages received' means an amount received
through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or
tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into
in lieu of such prosecution. 235 Schleier's assertion was that
ADEA actions are "based upon tort or tort type rights." There-
fore, he contended, they should be excluded under the regula-
tion's plain language.23 6
The Court responded by stating that even if it agreed with the
respondent as to the characterization of the action as tort or tort
type, that would not be a sufficient basis for exclusion of his
settlement proceeds.2 37 Stevens wrote, "The regulatory require-
ment that the amount be received in a tort type action is not a
substitute for the statutory requirement that the amount be re-
ceived 'on account of personal injuries or sickness'; it is an addi-
tional requirement.'2 38
232 Id. at 2165 (quoting Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126). Of final note regarding the
characterization in Thurston of liquidated damages as punitive in nature is Ste-
vens' observation that, under that decision, liquidated damages were only avail-
able under the ADEA if "the employer ... knew or showed reckless disregard for
the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." Id. at 2165 n.5
(quoting Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126). Stevens pointed to this as further proof that
liquidated damages were not designed to compensate discrimination victims
under the ADEA. Id. If they had been, the employer's knowledge of his wrong-
doing or reckless disregard of ADEA standards would not be the critical factor in
award determinations. Id.
233 Id. at 2165.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 2165-66.
237 Id. at 2166.
238 Id. at 2166 (emphasis added).
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In this very significant statement, the Court indicated its ac-
ceptance of the Commissioner's argument239 that exclusion is
authorized only when two conditions are met: (1) when the
amount was received pursuant to an action (whether through
settlement or prosecution) "based upon tort or tort type rights";
and (2) when the amount was received "on account of personal
injuries or sickness."240 In a footnote, the Court acknowledged
that "arguably" this had notalways been the treatment that the
Commissioner had given the provision. But, the Court main-
tained that "the Commissioner unambiguously contends that
the regulation is not intended to eliminate the 'on account of'
requirement from the statutory language" and that the Justices
in the majority "agree that she reads the regulation correctly in
this case."241 Therefore, the Court found, Schleier could not
rely on the text of the regulation for exclusion.242
Third-and finally, the Court held that the respondent's dam-
ages are not excludable under its reasoning in United States v.
Burke.243 Schleier had argued that Burke compelled a finding of
excludability in that the Supreme Court's holding there rested
on a determination of whether the claim was based on "tort or
tort type rights" within the meaning of Treasury Regulation
1.104-1 (c). 2 " The Court, however, held that for two independ-
ent reasons, Burke provided "no foundation" for Schleier's
assertion.245
First, the Court found that Schleier's ADEA recovery was not
based on tort or tort type rights as the Burke Court had con-
strued that term. In Burke, as discussed above, the Court found
that the pre-1991 version of Title VII did not create such tort or
tort type rights because it did not allow for compensatory dam-
ages or punitive damages. The Court found that remedies were
limited to back pay, injunctions, and. other forms of equitable
relief: "Tide VII was not tort-like because it addressed 'legal inju-
ries of an economic character.' "246
Schleier attempted to identify two elements of the remedial
scheme of the ADEA that he believed distinguished it from the -
239 See Reply Brief, supra note 203.
240 Schieir, 115 S. Ct. at 2165.
241 Id. at 2166 n.7.




246 Id. (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. at 238).
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remedies on which Burke was decided: jury trial and liquidated
damages. However, the Court found that neither was sufficient
to meet the tort-type right test because they lacked "what the
Burke Court recognized as the primary characteristic of an 'ac-
tion based upon tort type rights': the availability of compensa-
tory remedies. '2 4 7 The Court continued, referring to its opinion
in Burke, "Indeed, we noted that 'one of the hallmarks of tradi-
tional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of damages
to compensate the plaintiff 'fairly for injuries caused by the vio-
lation of his legal rights.' "248 Therefore, concluded the Court,
while the situation in Schleier presented a closer call than in
Burke, a recovery under the ADEA was not one based upon tort
or tort-type rights because, like "the pre-1991 version of Title
VII[,] [it] provide[s] no compensation 'for any of the other
traditional harms associated with personal injury, such as pain
and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other
consequential damages.' "249 As a result, the remedial scheme
of the ADEA was held to be insufficiently tort-like to bring it
within Burke's conception of tort type rights.
Secondly, and "more importantly," said the Schleier Court, the
respondent read the holding of Burke more broadly than he
should have. 50 Stevens wrote that the "tort or tort type rights"
analysis described above was part of what Burke required; he
wrote:
[H]owever, we did not hold that the inquiry into "tort or tort
type rights" constituted the beginning and end of the analysis
.... [W]e did not intend to eliminate the basic requirement
found in both the statute and the regulation that only amounts
received "on account of personal injuries or sickness" come
within [section] 104(a) (2)'s exclusion. Thus, though satisfaction
of Burke's "tort or tort type" inquiry is a necessary condition for
excludability under [section] 104(a) (2), it is not a sufficient
condition. 251
Therefore, the majority concluded that section 104(a) (2)'s
plain language, the text of the regulation in question, and the
247 Id.
248 Id. at 2166-67 (quoting Burke, 504 U.S. at 235).
249 Id. at 2167 (quoting Burke, 504 U.S. at 239).
250 Id.
251 Id. The Court noted here that IRS Rev. Rul. 93-88 seemingly interpreted
Burke as the respondent had, but also noted that the revenue ruling was not cur-
rently before the Court and that, in any event, it did not have the force and effect
of regulations. Id. at 2167 n.8.
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Court's prior decision in Burke "establish two independent re-
quirements that a taxpayer must meet" for excludability under
section 104(a) (2): "First, the taxpayer must demonstrate that
the underlying cause of action giving rise to the recovery is
'based upon tort or tort type rights; and second, the taxpayer
must show that the damages were received 'on account of per-
sonal injuries or sickness.' "252 Since in the Court's view Schleier
met neither part of this two-pronged test, the Court held that
under section 104(a) (2), no part of his settlement was
excludable..3
C. DISSENT IN SCJ1IEJER (JUSTICE SANiRA DAY O'CONNOR)
In what has been termed a "vigorous dissent,"254 Justice
O'Connor responded to the majority's opinion, opening her
dissent with the "emphatic pronouncement"255 that "[a]ge dis-
crimination inflicts a personal injury."256 Justice Thomas joined
Justice O'Connor in dissenting; Justice Souter joined Part II *of
the opinion, the section in which Justice O'Connor discussed
precedent.
In the first portion of her dissent, O'Connor took issue with
the majority over what constitutes personal injury. She argued
that even under the principles set forth in Burke, age discrimina-
tion should include ADEA damages because they are received
"on account of" the personal injury associated with age discrimi-
nation.257 In her view, the majority effectively limited the sec-
tion 104(a) (2) exception to tangible injuries, a position she
called "a reading rejected by eight Members of the Court in
Burke and contradicted by an agency's reasonable interpretation
of the statute it administers." 251
For O'Connor, the proper standard for exclusion under sec-
tion 104(a) (2) was set forth in the test found in Threlkeld v. Com-
missioner,59 where the Court stated, "To determine whether the
252 Id. at 2167.
253 Id.
254 Linda Greenhouse, High Court Rules an Award on Age Preudice Is Taxable,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1995, at D2. See also Friedman & Sanders, supra note 210, at
Outside Counsel, 1. The authors comment that 'Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
vigorously disputed the majority's contention that damages received under the
ADEA are not received on account of personal injuries or sickness." Id.
255 Taxation and Federal Procedure, supra note 209, at 3079.
256 Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 2167-68.
259 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
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injury complained of is personal, we must look to the origin and
character of the claim . . . and not to the consequences of the
injury. '260 Therefore, O'Connor wrote, under Threlkeld, section
104(a) (2) allowed exclusion of damages so long as they were
"on account of any invasion of the rights that an individual is
granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law."261
O'Connor noted that this view had prevailed until Burke, an
opinion from which she dissented because of her disagreement
with the idea that the nature of the remedies available deter-
mine the character of the underlying rights. 262 She continued
with the observation that "whether a remedy sounds in tort
often depends on arbitrary characterizations." 263 The majority
had, however, in her view, avoided the issue by laying down a per
se rule that an age discrimination-based discharge does not fall
within the "personal injury or sickness" language of the exclu-
sion, a position she found to be in direct conflict with the posi-
tion of eight justices in Burke that discrimination does inflict
personal injury.264
In Part II of her dissent, O'Connor argued that under the
Court's precedents, ADEA damages should be excludable. 65
She noted that, for thirty-five years, the IRS had consistently
viewed Regulation 1.104-1 (C)2 6 6 as determining conclusively the
requirements of section 104(a) (2), right up through Burke, a
case in which the Commissioner asserted that interpretation
should be followed and in which the Court deferred to the IRS
regulation and the Commissioner's interpretation of it.267 She
then stated, "It is only in one sentence in her reply brief that the
Commissioner expressed a view at odds with 35 years of adminis-
trative rulings, agency practice, and representations to the
cdurts-a sentence that the Court expands into its holding to-
day."268 "Unless the Court is willing to declare these positions to
be unreasonable," she concluded, "they cannot be ignored."269
260 Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2168 (quoting Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299).
261 Id.
262 Id. at 2169.
263 Id. at 2169. Interestingly, for support of this comment, O'Connor directed
readers to Schmitz and Downey and the different approaches the two circuit courts
took regarding the nature of liquidated damages. Id. at 2167.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 2171.
26 29 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1995).
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VII. COMMENTATORS' VIEWS ON SCHLFIER AND ITS
ANTICIPATED IMPACT
A. OVERViEW
As noted above, Schleier's case was closely followed, and the
Supreme Court's decision was much anticipated. Within the
legal profession, attorneys with specializations in employment
and taxation were particularly interested in the outcome as were
other professionals such as tax advisors, accountants, and
human resource and personnel directors. While it is too early to
gauge the full impact of the Supreme Court's decision in
Schleier, a few common threads of expectation have emerged
from the comments made by tax experts and legal practitioners
after the decision was handed down.
B. CONFUSION FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
SCJ-LEZER AS TO THE DECISION'S IMPACT
Commentators have broadly noted that much uncertainty and
confusion remains as to the scope and impact of the Supreme
Court's decision in Schleier and that, consequently, it is difficult
to predict with accuracy the legal landscape that the decision
will shape.27 ° According to Gary Friedman and Harvey Sanders,
it seems clear from the decision that damages received under
the ADEA and other statutes with like remedial provisions are
not excludable.7 1 However, they comment, "While clarifying
the tax treatment of awards and settlements under the ADEA,
the court remained conspicuously silent on such treatment of
damages received under the numerous other federal, state, and
270 For further discussion of the confusion remaining after the decision along
with other observations concerning the opinion and its potential effects, see Ar-
thur J. Hamilton & Diane A. Riordan, Wat Does Schleier Mean for Race and Gender
Discrimination Recoveries, 95 TAx NoTEs TODAY 146-80 (July 27, 1995); Unclarity
Reigns on Taxation of Awards After Schleier and Suspension of IRS Rule, PENS. & BENE-
rrs DAILY (BNA), at dl I (Nov. 16, 1995); Robert W. Wood, Schleier Strikes Taxpay-
ers Three Times, 95 TAx NoTEs TODAY 146-79 (July 27, 1995); Hyman Lovitz &
Sidney L. Gold, Age Bias Settlements Are Taxable Income, TuE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 5, 1995, at Business Law 9. And for recent law review treatments of taxation
issues involved, see Scott E. Copple, How Many Remedies Make a Tort? The Aftermath
of U.S. v. Burke and Its Impact on the Taxability of Discrimination Awards, 14 VA. TAX
REv. 589 (1995); Robert Cate Illig, Note, Tort Reform and the Tax Code: An Opportu-
nity to Narrow the Personal Injuries Exemption, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1459 (1995);'Andrew
M. Wright, Note, Commissioner v. Schleier: An Approach for Interpreting the Exclusion
under LR C. Section 104(a)(2) of Awards or Settlements in Federal Employment Discrimi-
nation Claims, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 991 (1995).
271 Friedman & Sanders, supra note 210, at Outside Counsel 1.
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local anti-discrimination statutes .... *"272 According to Fried-
man and Sanders, the main question left open in Schlier is
"[h]ow damages received under current Title VII, and those
anti-discrimination statutes that provided for remedies which
are compensatory in nature, should be treated for tax
purposes."
273
Other commentators agree that this is a major question left
unsettled by the decision. In comments he made about the tax-
ability of discrimination recoveries at a November 8, 1995, meet-
ing of the District of Columbia Bar Association, Thomas F.
Joyce, who argued the case before the Supreme Court on
Schleier's behalf, said, "We can all only speculate."274 He con-
tinued with the observation that while discrimination victims'
potential tax liability had been increased by each of the three
branches of the federal government over the past six months,
the increases had occurred without any additional clarity con-
cerning the issue. 75 Joyce believes that Schleier will "likely ...
add to the state of confusion surrounding ADEA awards rather
than resolve it."' 276 He continues, "There is the uncertainty of
when there is a sufficiently close link between damages and per-
sonal injury. Unfortunately, we don't know what that [link]
is."277
In any event, commentators seem to think that discrimination
plaintiffs will face a rather stiff test in meeting the two prongs set
forth in Schleier. Philip G. Cohen writes:
With respect to discrimination claims, in general plaintiffs will
have to jump through two hoops. First, they must base their
claim on statutes that provide tort-like remedies, jury trials and
punitive damages being insufficient in this regard. Second, they
must establish that the damages received are provided to com-
pensate them for some injury, e.g., psychological harm resulting
from the illegal discrimination.2 78
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Rod Garcia, IRS and Discrimination Lawyers Puzzle Over Taxes on Awards, 95
TAx NoTEs TODAY 220-24 (Nov. 9, 1995).
275 Id.
276 Claudia MacLachlan, ADEA Back Pay, Punies Are Held Taxable by Court, NAT'L
L.J., June 26, 1995, at B1.
277 Id.
278 Philip G. Cohen, Schleier Requires Congress to Clarify When Damages Received for
Discrimination Are Not Taxable: Commissioner v. Schleier, 47 TAX EXECUTIVE No. 5,
Sept. 19, 1995, at 365.
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He expresses concern that the taxability of illegal discrimination
recoveries could depend on "a whole range of factors," such as
the statute under which the claimant is suing, the type of harm
involved (physical or financial), the intentional or unintentional
nature of the discrimination, and when the discrimination claim
is made.279
Furthermore, observing that the two-part standard set forth in
Schleier gives discrimination victims a higher duty than automo-
bile victims, 2 0 Cohen asserts his belief that the holding will re-
sult in a system in which the tax treatment tort victims receive
may "differ for a number of reasons that do not appear fair or
rational."281 He concludes, "Ironically, as a result of Schleier, a
new caste system has been established, albeit not as invidious as
a classification based on race, sex, and age, but just as
irrational."282
Besides the discrimination statutes noted above, an additional
area of uncertainty involves the tax treatment that punitive dam-
ages will receive after Schleier. According to Robert W. Wood,
"[O]ne of the more insidious effects of [Schleier] would appear
to be in the context of punitive damages. Although [Schleier] is
not explicitly a punitive damages case, it certainly suggests that
the Supreme Court will favorably view the IRS claims that all
punitive damages should be taxable."2 8 3 He continues, "The
Supreme Court virtually says as much, because it treats the liqui-
dated portion of ADEA damages as punitive, and then con-
cludes that as punitive damages, such liquidated amounts must
be taxable."284 Wood notes that the Schleier approach, if it is be-
ing interpreted correctly as an impediment to any finding of ex-
cludability, is in striking contrast to U.S. Tax Court decisions
regarding punitive damages.285
Yet Wood and other commentators express their views about
the taxability of punitives in terms of "likelihoods" and
279 Id.
28 This is similar to Stevens' hypothetical in Schleier, discussed supra notes 221-
227. In the hypothetical, the automobile victim must prove that mental or physi-
cal injuries were caused by the illegal discrimination.
281 Cohen, supra note 278, at 365.
282 Id.
283 WOOD, supra note 212, at 8. Wood's article contains a thorough tracing of
the controversy surrounding tax treatment of punitive damages through the past
few years. See alsoJames Serven, The Taxation of Punitive Damages: Horton Lays an
Egg? 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 215 (1995).
284 WOOD, supra note 212, at 8.
285 Id.
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"probabilities," reflecting the uncertain scope of Schleies reach.
Friedman and Sanders write:
[I]t appears that, after [Schleier], punitive damages awarded
under Title VII, and under other anti-discrimination statutes,
likely will be taxable. Like the liquidated damages under the
ADEA punitive damages are not determined on the basis of the
injury suffered by the plaintiff, but rather on whether the em-
ployer acted "with malice or reckless indifference to the plain-
tiff's rights.286
Two governmental actions have come about in response to
this uncertainty; both Congress and the IRS seem to recognize
the confusion existing around Schleier and are responding. First,
the Internal Revenue Service, on August 3, 1995, (1) suspended
Revenue Ruling 93-88, which directed that disparate treatment
discrimination awards under the Civil Rights Act and the Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act be excluded; and (2) asked for public
comment and guidance after the Supreme Court's holding in
Schleier as to the anticipated effect the decision would have on
the treatment of recoveries.287
Second, as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1995,
Congress is considering sweeping changes in the scope of the
tax exclusion as it has stood.288 According to Claudia MacLach-
lan, the changes are "aimed primarily at clearing up conflict in
decisions in the appeals courts, where there is a split on how to
treat punitives arising from physical injuries, with some courts
granting exclusions and others denying them."289 She continues
that "[t] he legislation would clarify the problem by taxing those
awards" and by "eliminat[ing] the tax exclusion that many
courts have allowed for damages awards in cases involving non-
physical injuries such as age discrimination."290 She notes a
comment by Thomas Joyce, discussed above, who said that the
legislation is designed to "shore up" the six-to-three decision in
286 Friedman & Sanders, supra note 210, at 1.
287 Tax Liability, IRS Asks for Comment on Court's Holding That Awards in Age Bias
Case Are Taxable, 1995 DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES 150 d63 (BNA) at G150
(Aug. 4, 1995). In Schleier, as noted above, the majority acknowledged in a foot-
note that its decision was inconsistent with Revenue Ruling 93-88, but noted that
an interpretive ruling cannot overturn the plain language of a statute. Schleier,
115 S. Ct. at 2167 n.8.
288 Claudia MacLachlan, Tax Break on Damages About to Be Eliminated, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 18, 1995, at A7. See also Garcia, supra note 274, at 220-24.
289 MacLachlan, supra note 276, at A7.
290 Id.
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the Schleier case because of a fear that a different interpretation
could occur if the Court were to receive a similar case again.291
The results of these initiatives by the IRS and Congress are
unknown at the time of this writing, but they further indicate
that the state of the law in this area, and the scope of the section
104(a) (2) exception, are not fully known. Schleier may prove to
be the catalyst for further legislation or court decisions delineat-
ing excludability under that provision. At this point, however, as
Friedman and Sanders note, "the [Schleier] decision may well be
remembered for the issues it left open rather than the single
issue it resolved. ' 292
C. EFFECTS OF SCHLEI ANTICIPATED BY COMMENTATORS
At the same time, commentators believe that they can predict
some results with a fair degree of certainty. First, commentators
expect heightened difficulty and cost after Schleier in reaching
settlements in discrimination cases involving, at a minimum,
ADEA claims. This view is widely expressed by commentators.293
For example, Stuart Bompey and RachaelJeck comment that, in
settlements, the tax characterization of the amounts involved:
[C]an significantly affect the dynamics of the settlement pro-
cess-especially in light of the recent Supreme Court decision
Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. Schleier. Schleier's immediate im-
pact is clear-it will be harder to settle ADEA claims since plain-
tiffs are likely to raise their settlement demands to compensate
for awards which will be deemed taxable under Schleier.294
Friedman and Sanders agree, predicting that settlement de-
mands "invariably will be higher" to meet the heightened tax
burden under Schleier, and that employers' out-of-pocket costs
for settlement will also grow.295
291 Id. (quoting Thomas F. Joyce).
292 Friedman & Sanders, supra note 210, at Outside Counsel 1.
-3 See David G. Savage, U.S. Supreme Court Rules Age Bias Damages Are Taxable,
L.A. TIMES,June 15, 1995, at A6; Friedman & Sanders, supra note 210, at Outside
Counsel 1; Lovitz & Gold, supra note 270, at Business Law 9; MacLachlan, supra
note 276, at BI. MacLachlan writes, "In an opinion that only the Internal Reve-
nue Service could love, the U.S. Supreme Court has disappointed employers and
employees... [with .its holding in Schleier.]" MacLachlan, supra note 276, at BI.
294 Structuring ADEA Settlement Agreements: Plaintiffs Likely to Raise Demands After
Schleier, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at S3.
25 Friedman & Sanders, supra note 210, at Outside Counsel 1. The predicted
increase on the employer's part will be, according to the writers, due to the need
to make contributions to social security, unemployment insurance, and medi-
care, for example, to meet the tax withholding obligations imposed as a result of
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Douglas S. McDowell, general counsel to the Equal Employ-
ment Advisory Counsel,296 described the probable result of
Schleier as making it "more difficult and expensive to settle." 291
Lawyers for management and employees alike seem to agree
with this assessment.298 And although the impact on other dis-
crimination cases is not yet totally clear, Lovitz and Gold assert
that Schleier will have a significant impact on other discrimina-
tion cases because settlement agreements and severance pack-
ages will have to be carefully structured to attempt to avoid the
tax treatment given SchleierY99
Concern over the societal implications of the decision was re-
flected in many of the comments. The Los Angeles Times
wrote, "The 6-3 decision.., could.., prove a costly setback for
thousands of workers who lose their jobs through a corporate
downsizing and accept a settlement of age-discrimination
charges." 00 And the Washington Post noted the difficult timing
of the decision in terms of its impact on many Americans,
describing the time as one when "the nation's workforce is aging
and corporate downsizing is the trend."30 1 Accordingly, an in-
creasing number of older workers are filing age discrimination
claims, and the decision "effectively reduce[s] money awards
that older people win. '3 0 2 The desirability of this outcome de-
serves examination. Legal commentator Robert Wood predicts
"dire results" for many workers and their former employees who
are attempting to settle.3 0 3
A second anticipated effect is that plaintiffs may begin to as-
sert related but attenuated claims solely on the basis of taxation
considerations.3 0 4 Discrimination claimants may begin to make
decisions regarding which causes of action to press based on a
desire to avoid Schleier's negative tax implications. Friedman
Schlier. Id. Of course, employers' settlement costs will also increase in direct
proportion to the higher demands of plaintiffs, should the employer attempt to
pursue settlement.
296 A body with approximately 300 members, most of which are Fortune 500
companies.
297 MacLachlan, supra note 276, at B1.
298 Id.
299 Lovitz and Gold, supra note 270, at Business Law 9.
30 Savage, supra note 293, at A6.
301 Joan Biskupic & Albert B. Crenshaw, Damages in Age Bias Cases Taxable, High
Court Rules: Decision Effectively Cuts Awards Elderly Win, WAsH. POST, June 15, 1995,
at B10.
302 Id.
303 Wood, supra note 213, at 8.
304 Friedman & Sanders, supra note 210, at Outside Counsel 1.
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and Sanders suggest, as well, that there may be a rise in pendent
state law claims or collateral tort claims, both of which often al-
low for compensatory damage recovery.30 5 As Robert Wood puts
it, "The presence of such other claims will likely become even
more important now that age discrimination (at least for federal
ADEA claims) is no longer on the plaintiff's preferred tax-free
hit list."30 6 Statute shopping could easily result.30 7
The assertion of additional claims seems fairly certain; how-
ever, whether this will result in more litigation remains to be
seen. Some think a'related effect will likely be the increase in
litigation predicted by Thomas Joyce;308 others believe that
plaintiffs may be hesitant to take their cases to court for fear that
damages will be allocated unfavorably.30 9 Certainly, if settle-
ment becomes increasingly difficult as employers and employees
have to reach further to arrive at resolutions acceptable to both
parties, litigation may become a plaintiff's only option if she
wishes to pursue her claim.
A final effect- noted by commentators is that further narrow-
ing of the scope of excludability to eliminate various types of
relief under like statutes should be expected. 310 According to
one commentator, "It has long galled the IRS that any employ-
ment-related dispute should result in excludable amounts; ...
[t] he IRS is now armed with a decision in Schleier that might be
seen as substantially undercutting the IRS's admission of non-
taxability for Title VII recoveries in Revenue Ruling 93-88."311
Another report on the decision characterized it as part of the
Supreme Court's "consistent pattern of protecting federal and
state tax sources. "312 Wood concludes:
In the wake of Schleier, employees, employment lawyers and tax
professionals will have to get used to a changing landscape that is
increasingly hostile to excludability. The apparent two-level re-
quirement to now satisfy section 104 may well be applied to types
305 Id.
- Wood, supra note 212, at 1.
307 MacLachlan, supra note 276, at B1.
308 Id. (citing Thomas F. Joyce).
309 Friedman & Sanders, supra note 210, at Outside Counsel 1.
310 Dean L. Surkin &JosephJ. Handlin, SchleierNarrows the Window for Exclusion
of Damages, 95 TAx NoTEs TODAY 146-78 (July 27, 1995).
311 WOOD, supra note 213, at 8.
312 John J. Tigue & Linda A. Lacewell, The Supreme Court's 1994-95 Term, N.Y.
L.J., July 20, 1995, at Tax Litigation 3.
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of injuries well beyond the ADEA context, and indeed well be-
yond the employment context.3
13
VIII. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Certainly, Schlier was a disappointing decision to those who
had hoped for a more liberal interpretation of section
104(a) (2)'s exception to taxability. A finding of excludability of
ADEA damages under that section had appeal for several rea-
sons. The first reason is that such a finding would have been
consistent with a perceived judicial trend to broaden the sec-
tion's exception to cover more non-physical causes of action,314
many of which are employment-related,315 thereby favoring dis-
crimination victims. The Supreme Court in Burke specifically
held that employment discrimination awards could constitute
tort or tort-type damages if the cause of action was due to a tort-
like injury for which a discrimination statute provided an appro-
priate remedy, as defined therein.316 The Ninth Circuit majority
in Schmitz picked up on this theme in its assertion that the rem-
edy provided by the ADEA does compensate for a tort-like in-
jury.317 This judicial trend, including the Supreme Court's prior
endorsement of sorts,.was not an ill-conceived example of ajudi-
cial ad hoc approach to the law. Instead, it was part of a steady
movement toward recognition of the seriousness of such non-
physical personal injuries. This movement is very much in keep-
ing with the nationwide trend in the law toward greater sensitiv-
'ity to discrimination in many contexts, including that practiced
against the elderly.
313 Wood, supra note 213, at 8.
314 Susan Kim Matlow, Note, Exclusion of Personal Injury Damages: Have the Courts
Gone Too Far? 44 VAND. L. REV. 369, 371 (1991).
315 See Annotation, Damages for Allegedly Wrongful Interference With Employment
Rights as Received "On Account of Personal Injuries" so as to Be Excludable from Income
Tax Under 26 USCS § 104(a)(2), 106 A.L.R. FED. 321 (1992), for an overview of
federal cases involving employment-related injuries that have been considered
for the purpose of determining whether damages received could be excluded
under § 104(a) (2). They include causes of action grounded in the First Amend-
ment, equal protection, civil rights, Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the Fair
Labor Standards Act, all of which have given rise to tort or tort-like claims. See
also Heen, supra note 29, at 551 n.l (adding the Americans With Disabilities Act
to the list).
316 Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 239 (1992) ("No doubt discrimination could constitute
a 'personal injury' for purposes of section 104(a) (2) if the relevant cause of ac-
tion evidenced a tort-like conception of injury and remedy."). With the remedies
available under the ADEA, that tort-like conception is evidenced.
317 Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (4th Cir. 1994).
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Age discrimination, moreover, can be extremely damaging,
both physically and emotionally, to the person subjected to it.318
One reason that section 104(a) (2) damages are excluded is to
avoid hitting the unfortunate taxpayer twice; since he has al-
ready suffered enough loss in the form of personal injury, he
should not be forced to "suffer further" through taxation of a
damage award.31 9 Many are of the opinion that plaintiffs who
receive ADEA damages, like other tort victims, suffer significant
personal injury, and as the courts in Rickel, Pistillo, and Schmitz
persuasively argue, they should not be treated any differently
than any other tort-sufferer.3 2 0 Their view is that the taxpayer
should not be penalized for the non-physical nature of the tort,
but treated the same as a tort victim who suffers from physical
injuries.3 21 Whether there will be any outcry based on these pol-
icy concerns that might cause either Congress or the Court to
take steps back toward this more generous interpretation of the
exclusion is unclear at this point.
Additionally, the question remains as to whether the Burke
"examination of the remedial scheme" test, despite the Court's
utilization and clarification of it in Schleier, is the best possible
test for taxability of claims brought under section 104(a) (2) or
whether it is part of the interpretive problem that exists con-
cerning that section. The Burke test, with its heavy focus on the
nature of the remedial scheme, has been considered by many
scholars, tax and law professionals, and students to be an unsat-
318 See Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1990). The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in terming Pistillo's treatment at his employer's hands a
non-taxable tort, writes, "Pistillo endured his employer's indignities, insults and
age discrimination; suffered a dignitary tort; and was personally injured." Id.
319 JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION 193 (7th ed. 1991).
320 Pistillo, 912 F.2d at 150. The Pistillo court quotes from Rickel the proposition
that "[t]he successful ADEA plaintiff is being treated no better ... than the typi-
cal tort victim who suffers a physical injury. We see no reason to treat one per-
sonal injury any differently than another." Id. (citing Rickel v. Commissioner, 900
F.2d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 1990)). The court in Schmitz also quotes from Rickel, stat-
ing, "The successful ADEA plaintiff is being treated no better (or worse now)
than the typical tort victim who suffers a physical injury." Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 794
(citing Ricke4 900 F.2d at 664).
321 For an interesting approach to the problem of exclusion of non-physical
personal injury torts, see Heen, supra note 29. Heen suggests that employment-
related injuries reduce an individual's human capital investments (activities that
increase a person's resources, therefore increasing his or her future income-
both monetary and non-monetary). Id. at 569. She would therefore tax all such
employment discrimination awards in the same way as personal injury awards are
taxed. Id. at 608.
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isfactory tool for determining exclusions under section
104(a) (2).32 As a result, reformulating the test has been
suggested.
While there are many ideas as to how 'the Burke test might be
reshaped, 23 Justice O'Connor's dissent in that case, which is
echoed in Judge Trott's concurrence in Schmitz and in
O'Connor's dissent in Schleier, focused the inquiry to determine
applicability of the section 104(a) (2) exclusion on the nature of
the harm suffered rather than on the remedies available.324
O'Connor, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote, "In my view, the
remedies available to title VII plaintiffs do not fix the character
of the right they seek to enforce."325 Instead, she says, the "pur-
poses and operation" of the statute in question should be ex-
amined. 26 If those statutory purposes and operation are closely
analogous or similar to the purposes and operation of tort law,
then, she writes, the damages should be excluded.2 7
This seems to be one sound approach to the section that
could be taken. Moreover, O'Connor's approach would allow
the judicial trend toward greater protection of employees
against discrimination under section 104(a) (2) noted above to
continue. This view, however, does not seem to have enjoyed
'much support in the Court to date. Whether and how that test
will be changed is another unanswered question.
And finally, the question remains whether Internal Revenue
Code section 104(a) (2) itself needs clarification so that it may
clearly direct determinations of exclusion or inclusion for not
322 See generally Douglas A. Kahn, Taxation of Punitive Damages Obtained in a Per-
sonal Injury Claim, 94 TAx NoTEs TODAY 209-74 (1994); Ari 0. Liveson, More Dam-
ages for Discrimination Held Excludable, 53 TAX'N FOR AcCT. 86 (1994); Gardner &
Willey, supra note 38; Heen, supra note 29; Matlow, supra note 314; Sciuto, supra
note 47; Kevin C. Jones, Taxation of Personal Injury Damage Awards: A Call for a
Definition of the Scope of the Section 104(a)(2) Exclusion, 66 TEMP. L. Rxv. 919 (1993).
323 See, e.g., Heen, supra note 29, at 606 (t0lting an alternative human capital
approach). See also Helleloid & Mattson, supra note 47, at 86 (discussing factors
other than the Burke remedial scheme test that might be part of a multifaceted
§ 104(a) (2) exclusion analysis, including payor's intent to settle tort-like claims,
settlement agreement language, payroll treatment of settlement for tax purposes
by payor, type of claims pursued by the settlement recipient, and others).
324 Sciuto, supra note 47, at 304-305. She states that "[m]ost of us, like Justice
O'Connor, look to the nature of the conduct-rather than the nature of the
remedy-to determine whether it is tortious." Id. She notes that most of the
briefs submitted in Burke on behalf of the respondents took that position. Id.
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just ADEA damages, but for all forms of physical or nonphysical
personal injuries or sickness. Many believe that the heart of the
confusion about the taxability of discrimination-related damages
and determinations under the Burke test lies in the lack of a co-
herent philosophy or approach to section 104(a) (2) exclu-
sions.3 28  As noted, the confusion has also affected
determinations of excludability of punitive awards. 2 9
While detailed discussions of or proposals for congressional
or administrative reform of section 104(a) (2) are beyond the
scope of this comment, the need for such reform deserves note.
Congressional reform of the section would be beneficial for a
number of reasons. First, section 104(a) (2) is a very significant
Internal Revenue Code provision and is one of the last remain-
ing "loopholes" in the Code. If it is to continue to benefit the
injured taxpayers it is intended to help, it should be carefully
thought out and drafted with clear parameters for applicability
that are in keeping with a congressional determination of who
should be served by the section. Or if it is to be closed, that
should be a legislative decision as well.
Second, as it is currently read, the exception found in section
104(a) (2) is granted inconsistently due to its unclear scope.
Based on this uneven application, some analysts advocate repeal
of the section's exception entirely.33 0 Without the clearly indi-
cated reform, if exclusion abuses mount or application (and the
accompanying loss of revenue to the government) continues to
broaden, the "solution" of repeal might be considered more se-
riously. Bittker and McMahon write that the section 104(a) (2)
exclusion from gross income of damages from personal injuries
or wrongful death is "deeply entrenched in private tort law," and
"thus, a repeal of section 104(a) (2) would create shock waves
throughout the personal injury area and would no doubt lead to
larger verdicts and higher insurance premiums." 331 Such repeal
could also lead to public outcry and other undesirable conse-
quences, including the denial of the exclusion (and to subse-
328 See Kolks, supra note 47. Her article is but one sample of the scholarly writ-
ing on the section's lack of clarity.
32 See Feinberg, supra note 21; Kahn, supra note 322; Henning, supra note 45;
Day, supra note 38. For a discussion of the 1989 amendment to § 104(a) (2) re-
garding punitive damages, see supra part II.B. The continuing confusion con-
cerning the taxability of punitives continues to exacerbate the confusion over
§ 104(a) (2) as a whole.
330 See Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed? 38
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 43 (1988) (suggesting that the section be abolished).
33' BITIKER & McMAHON, supra note 26, at 6-7.
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quent tax liability) to those with traumatic injuries and
inadequate recoveries who are arguably deserving of the sec-
tion's benefits.
In his Burke dissent, Justice Scalia reveals his own frustration
with the broadening application of the section. He advocates a
solution short of repeal of the section, but one with far-reaching
implications,just the same.332 He asserts that the plain language
of the exception suggests it should be read to include only, inju-
ries to physical (and mental) health.333 In her dissent in Schleier,
as noted above, Justice O'Connor expresses concern that this
analysis, while not stated, underlies the majority opinion in that
case.
33 4
If O'Connor is correct or if Scalia's suggestion were to gain
adequate support, that approach, too, would lead to a signifi-
cant change in the section 104(a) (2) exclusion and would likely
remove its effect from those with awards for nonphysical per-
sonal injuries arguably as severe as those in the included physi-
cal category. This possibility brings into sharp focus the
question of whether this outcome would reflect Congress' intent
in establishing the section's exception. It again demonstrates
the risk of inaction on the part of Congress in the face of the
existing confusion regarding the section's application.
Congressional clarification of section 104(a)(2), if well-con-
ceived, could significantly reduce the criticism leveled against it
and allow compassion for personal injury victims to be main-
tained within the nation's income taxation system. Even simple
definitional sections could reflect Congress's intent for the
proper boundaries of the exception. 35
Apart from avoiding the risk of repeal or significant reduc-
tion, clarification would also insure that similarly situated tax-
payers suffering different types of injuries would be treated
332 Burke, 112 S.Ct. at 1875-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting what Scalia
calls a "common sense interpretation" of the section limiting it to "injuries to
physical (or mental) health" and removing such dignitary torts as defamation
from its scope).
333 Id. at 1875.
334 Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2169-70 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
335 See Jones, supra note 322, at 938, for his proposal for reform of the section.
He writes, "As [§ ] 104(a) (2) is written, the terms 'personal injury' and 'dam-
ages' have no content from which the courts can decide if an award fits within
the scope of [§ ] 104(a) (2)." Id. at 937. "There simply is no cohesive tax theory
justifying the exclusion of such awards." Id. at 938. He then sets forth very spe-
cific suggestions as to definitions of certain words that should be included in a
reformation of the section. Id. at 940-45.
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similarly. Thus, the policy interests of fairness and consistency
would be better served if the section were revisited by Congress.
And, as the above indicates, Congress may be interested in
strengthening Schleier through legislation, so clarification of sec-
tion 104(a) (2) may indeed result, one way or the other.3 36
IX. EFFECT ON THE AIR INDUSTRY
Age discrimination is both a historical and present-day con-
cern for airline employees, and the ADEA is one of the statutes
considered to have a special impact on the airline industry.337
Two distinct types of problems exist in the area of age discrimi-
nation in aviation employment law: conflicts related to the Age-
Sixty Rule, 3 8 and cases of individual discrimination unrelated to
Age-Sixty. Significant ADEA cases have arisen in both
categories.
First, individual airline employees with issues unrelated to the
Age-Sixty Rule have brought suits under the ADEA based on
personal claims of age discrimination against them. Some have
been part of class action suits against their airline employers,
while others are individual plaintiffs. Whether brought by single
plaintiffs or members of class action suits, several of the major
age discrimination cases of recent years involve airlines and
their workers. 3 9
The Age-Sixty Rule is a second area in which age-related issues
impact airline workers. Two lines of cases have developed
336 While lack of clarity and other problems associated with this section are
obviously of extreme significance to the taxability of non-physical personal injury
damages, the need for overall reform of the section is not the focus of this com-
ment; the taxability of ADEA damage awards is.
337 WiLLIAM E. THOMS & FRANK J. DOOLEY, AIRLrNE LABOR LAw: THE RAILWAY
LABOR Acr AND AVIATION AFrER DEREGULATION 127 (1990). Other statutes and
regulations that impact airline workers in a significant fashion are the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration regulations, the Airline Deregulation Act, and the National Labor
Relations Act, among others. Id.
338 The Age-Sixty Rule is found at 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1991). It states that
No certificate holder may use the services of any person, and pro-
hibit any person from serving, as a pilot on any plane engaged in
operations under Part 121, Certification and Operations: Domestic,
Flag, and Supplemental Air Carriers and Commercial Operators of
Large Aircraft, if that person has reached his or her 60th birthday.
Id.
339 In addition to Schmitz, Downey, and Schleier, see Criswell v. Western Airlines,
709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983); Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111
(1985).
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under that rule: those involving removal of personnel from
flight duty at age sixty and those based on airlines' refusals to
hire pilots past a certain maximum hiring age. 4 ° Several Age-
Sixty Rule cases have been litigated under the ADEA, including
the oft-cited Western Airlines v. Criswell.341
The decision in Schleier regarding the taxability of ADEA dam-
ages affects several groups involved in the airline industry. First,
pilots with pre-1989 suits or settlements still pending are directly
affected by the resolution of the case.342 Airline employees with
post-1989 damages may be affected by this ruling on the test for
taxability under section 104(a) (2), since the scope of the 1989
rule on inclusion of punitive damages is unclear and the test for
what constitutes a section 104(a) (2) injury may be'changed so
that a finding that damages have some punitive nature would
not preclude exclusion. 43
One very important outcome of Schleier noted above is the ef-
fect it is expected to have on the structure of settlements and
decisions about litigation related to section 104(a) (2) causes of
action. 44 On the employee side, it is critical that attorneys or
advisors are apprised of the current criteria for section
104(a) (2) exclusion so that they can structure damage classifica-
tions in such a way as to benefit their clients.345 How sections of
the awaird are labelled may or may not have serious tax implica-
tions for the plaintiff employee.
On the management side, the inability of employees to ex-
clude ADEA damage awards from gross income for taxation pur-
poses will certainly affect settlement negotiations;
340 THOMS & DooLEv, supra note 337, at 137.
341 472 U.S. 400 (1985); see Katy Barklow, Comment, Rethinking the Age-60
Mandatory Retirement Rule: A Look at the Newest Movemen 59J. AIR L. & CoM. 101,
115 (1993) (containing an excellent overview of Age-Sixty rule litigation and its
implications).
342 As noted by the Schmitz court, the holdings in the cases are limited to pre-
1989 awards. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 793-94. After 1989, the issue of classification as
punitive damages becomes important, but the courts did not have to pass on that
type of case to rule on Downey and Schmitz.
343 See supra part II.B.
344 Gardner & Willey, supra note 38, at 230. The authors suggest that practi-
tioners should consider the tax implications under § 104(a) (2), both in structur-
ing litigation (evidence, pleadings, and arguments) and settlements, and advise
their clients carefully. Id. They note that terming damages "punitive" is risky in
the current legal environment, but that even punitives may be nontaxable if at-
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management's willingness to work in settlement situations to-
ward tax situations advantageous to the claimant may be a bar-
gaining chip that an airline can use to achieve more reasonable
settlements. The decision could have an effect on the approach
each side takes in settlement discussions where damages could
result; each might be willing to adjust the amount of settlement
dollars (or require the other side to do so) in keeping with the
new tax implications. On the other hand, it may prove a po-
larizing force that makes settlement more difficult.
And finally, airlines and their employees should keep the is-
sue of taxability of damage awards in mind when shaping future
contractual arrangements between them. The label that is ulti-
mately affixed to liquidated damages and back pay may affect
how the parties to airline employment contracts choose to struc-
ture their settlement agreements and the language they use to
express their intentions.
X. CONCLUSION
Schleier and the resolution of the split in circuits that it repre-
sents is important to the airline industry and to any taxpayer
who might receive age-related damages on an ADEA cause of
action. But, as this comment reflects, other issues concerning
taxation and exclusions under section 104(a) (2) and the ade-
quacy of the Burke test loom large, making Schleier important to
other discrimination victims and tort sufferers both because of
the attention it has brought to these issues and because its ra-
tionale may be applied far beyond the scope of age-related
issues.
Therefore, if the confusion surrounding the tax treatment of
ADEA damages causes careful consideration of the goals of sec-
tion 104(a) (2), it could have the beneficial result of helping the
Supreme Court, Congress, or the Internal Revenue Service
shape answers to the remaining questions that will best accom-
plish sound policy and well reasoned government goals. Main-
taining the exclusion for those harmed by discrimination seems
a worthwhile end, even if limitations are more carefully pro-
scribed. Hopefully, the Supreme Court or Congress will shape a
sound solution that will end the existing confusion and allow
the exclusion to serve the beneficial purpose for which it was
written.
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